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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I present potential solution sets to the question of why homeland security 
leaders and practitioners use intelligence to improve homeland security decisions. 
Specific roles and benefits of intelligence are identified, analyzed, and where applicable, 
extended to domestic security objectives across the homeland security community 
spectrum. This thesis purports and defends the theory that there are many and varied roles 
for intelligence for homeland security stakeholders. Six categories of benefits are 
presented as a frame work for homeland security decision makers, especially those with 
limited prior knowledge of threat intelligence, to consider as they conceptualize the 
employment or expectations of intelligence in a homeland security context. The adaptive 
threat orientation is introduced as a model for acquisition and maintenance of persistent 
decision advantage in the homeland security threat-scape.  
The adaptive threat orientation model relies on a continual, repeatable and 
consistent process, whereby homeland security leaders can acquire and maintain decision 
advantage over an adversary in the homeland security decision space. This thesis defines 
homeland security decision advantage, the elements necessary for its acquisition and 
maintenance, and ultimately defines and defends the value of intelligence in improving 
homeland security decisions. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Understanding how to act under conditions of incomplete information is 
the highest and most urgent human pursuit.  
Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007, p. 57) 
This thesis is not about how to “fix” or to intentionally aggrandize the role of 
intelligence in homeland security.  My objective here is to 1) identify and demonstrate 
the many and varied roles and benefits that intelligence may play in supporting the 
acquisition and maintenance of decision advantage in the homeland security threat-scape, 
and 2) potentially revolutionize the manner in which those decisions are made and 
dramatically increase the collective benefit of optimized homeland security policy and 
resource decisions to the nation by better understanding the role and benefits of using 
intelligence in homeland security.  
A career intelligence officer, the first time I had to justify what I do was when I 
became a student at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. An eclectic master’s degree program that brings together homeland 
security leaders and practitioners from across the country and across the homeland 
security enterprise, the CHDS experience prides itself (and rightly so) as challenging its 
students to critically analyze most every aspect of homeland security in both sum and 
parts. When asked by a classmate, a fire chief from a major metropolitan city that had 
firsthand experience in responding to an act of devastating domestic terrorism, “Andrew, 
where were you guys (the intelligence community) on that one?,” the best I could come 
up with was the well rehearsed “We have to be right every time, the terrorists only have 
to be right once.” Another classmate, a career public health officer responded, “I’ve gone 
my entire career without using intel, and, frankly, I don’t see what all the fuss is about.” 
After discussing my thoughts on “fixing” some of the procedural issues related to 
intelligence another colleague dead panned, “So you ‘fix’ the intel community, so what? 
What you do doesn’t matter until it changes what I do. [emphasis added]” Bingo. 
Those words “What you do doesn’t matter until it changes what I do” would drive almost 
every facet of research for this project. I picked apart every word of that sentence in an 
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effort to understand better what “change” meant, what it means to “matter,” who else “I” 
represented, and probably most important, the “whats” of homeland security that could be 
improved by the greater threat understanding only intelligence could provide. This thesis 
is my version of the “so what” to why homeland security leaders and practitioners may be 
well served to more closely examine the role, purpose, and value of intelligence within 
their decision-making processes.  Intelligence is not, should not, and cannot be an end 
unto itself (Keegan 2004, p. 321).  In order to be of any actual value, it must serve an end, 
and in the case of homeland security, that end ought to be a risk-based tactical, 
operational, political, or legal judgment.  As such, I suggest the purpose of homeland 
security intelligence is not to acquire threat data, or draft reports or predict adversary 
activity; rather, the purpose of homeland security intelligence should be to facilitate 
decision advantage for leaders and practitioners within the homeland security strategic, 
operational, or tactical decision-making environments.  Intelligence only becomes 
“value-added” for homeland security decision makers when the potential or anticipated 
benefits of using intelligence outweigh the costs or potential consequences of not using 
intelligence in support of decision processes.  I believe an incredible and virtually 
untapped value and opportunity exists for homeland security and intelligence community 
leaders and practitioners willing and able to take a hard look at how a tailored, timely, 
and accurate threat orientation might change the face, and ultimately the outcomes sought 
within the homeland security environment.  
A familiar maxim in the marketing industry is half of all marketing costs are 
wasted—but one can never be sure of which half (Neff, 2010).  Similarly, with 
intelligence, the value of intelligence can go largely unrecognized until the consequences 
of ignoring or misunderstanding threats lead to decisions being made in ignorance to or 
without regard to available threat information that can lead to catastrophic security (not 
intelligence) failures.  
I propose homeland security decision makers operating within a complex and 
dynamic threatscapewhom have acquired an appreciation for the role, purpose, and value 
(usefulness) of intelligence and have a realistic expectation of the derived benefits of 
homeland security intelligence will find themselves better able to leverage that 
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understanding in their decision making favor, potentially contributing to more effective, 
efficient, and persistent security decision advantage in comparison to those or against 
those lacking such an understanding.  
This thesis is organized into three sections:  
• The Role of Intelligence in Homeland Security  
• How Homeland Security Decision Advantage can be Acquired and 
Maintained 
• Six Derived Benefits of Intelligence-Based Homeland Decision 
Advantage 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
How can any man say what he should do himself if he is ignorant about 
what his adversary is about? 
Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini (as quoted by Rosello, 1991, p. 109) 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The role and derived benefits of intelligence in acquiring and maintaining 
homeland security decision advantage is insufficiently understood, valued or utilized in 
pursuit of strategic, operational, and tactical homeland security objectives.   
The American homeland security threatscape is neither a private sector, federal, 
state, nor local domain, it is a national domain wherein threats of violence and security 
activities (homeland security efforts) are in constant, and usually, counterbalancing 
movement (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2007, p. 1).  The specific value of 
intelligence within this arena has never been evaluated or subjected to any serious 
scrutiny—it is as if the intelligence community sees its value as self-evident while the 
academic, practitioner and policy communities seem either disinterested or under the 
mistaken perception everything related to intelligence is secret and therefore 
unimpeachable outside classified forums.  
To date, neither the intelligence community nor the homeland security community 
has adequately articulated, defined, or implemented a comprehensive or agreed upon role 
for intelligence in homeland security decision-making processes (DHS, 2007, p. 9).  
While the anticipated benefits of services for operational enablers, such as 
communication, medical, logistics, etc., are generally within common experience of most 
homeland security leaders and practitioners, the role of intelligence in homeland security 
seems to be less well understood or appreciated, especially among non-law enforcement 
professionals (Interagency Threat Assessment and coordination Group [ITACG], 2008).  
As the role (and subsequent value) of a lawyer or a dentist becomes acutely relevant for 
leaders and practitioners facing legal challenges or dentine sensitivities, the role and 
value of intelligence seems largely underappreciated or misunderstood until a major 
threat manifests or a crisis erupts.  I submit the potential revolutionary benefits for 
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homeland security leaders and practitioners using intelligence cannot be gained when 
called upon intermittently or only when “trouble” arises, especially in an age of 
constantly evolving asymmetric threats of previously unimaginable consequences.  The 
efficacy of intelligence in promoting decision advantage as an “on demand” capability is 
severely reduced in an environment of persistent and lethal threats.  The acquisition and 
maintenance of an adaptive threat orientation is as much or more the responsibility of the 
consumers of intelligence as it is intelligence producers.  Occasional or intermittent usage 
of threat knowledge of an asymmetric, adaptive, and cunning adversary within the 
dynamic and complex threatscape of homeland security is wholly inadequate to facilitate 
persistent and agile decision advantage and is likewise an unnecessary and entirely 
preventable invitation for disaster. Failure to appreciate and incorporate the role of 
intelligence in homeland security decisions may impede efforts to eliminate loss of 
opportunity, wasted resources, violations of civil or human rights, or potentially undue 
loss of lives and property.    
Homeland security objectives are not advanced when “intelligence knows” 
something as “intelligence” does not make decisions necessary to advance those 
objectives. In order to be most effective and efficient homeland security decision makers 
must understand how threats within their areas of responsibility (geographic, 
jurisdictional or otherwise) effect their operations and objectives. This understanding can 
come from two sources 1) direct contact with the threat or 2) intelligence. When 
intelligence is framed as such, the mystic veneer attributed to intelligence fades and the 
intelligence professionals and homeland security leaders and practitioners are in a better 
position to focus on creating processes and relationships that facilitate the need for 
timely, accurate, and tailored threat understanding. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
What are the roles and benefits of intelligence in acquiring and maintaining 
homeland security decision advantage?  
This thesis seeks to identify and examine specific and compelling roles for 
intelligence in acquiring and maintaining homeland security decision advantage as well 
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as the anticipated benefits derived the from acquisition and maintenance of an 
intelligence-based decision advantage.  Research was ordered around the following 
questions: 
• What are the roles of intelligence in acquiring and maintaining homeland 
security decision advantage? 
• What are the derived benefits of intelligence-based decision advantage for 
homeland security leaders and practitioners?  
C. METHODOLOGY 
Grounded theory is the research methodology chosen for this thesis. Grounded 
theory proposes the traditional concept of asserting and defending predetermined theses 
has the potential to negatively bias the use of research data by wittingly or unwittingly 
“channeling”  data and observations towards an intended hypothesis or persuade a 
researcher to disregard an emergent theory that fails to prove or disprove his or her thesis 
(Borgatti, 2009). Grounded theory is well suited for the broad nature of these research 
questions, as the research objectives had the potential to, and ultimately did, spring from 
the wide depth and breadth of research required for this method. The research approach 
for this project began with a thorough examination of multi-source video, audio, and print 
materials across the intelligence, homeland security, decision science, technology, legal, 
historical, information management, cultural, naturally occurring networks; including 
military, business, and academic fields of study to identify and distill the “raw materials” 
useful for homeland security leaders and practitioners wanting to improve decision 
quality.   
During the topical analysis of the data, elements and theories were captured and 
tracked using selective coding, loosely based on the research questions.  This liberal 
research process provided an appropriate mix of creative research opportunity and 
specific content capture without stifling potential elements as they emerged.  The coding 
structure loosely followed the two primary research questions. 
After research notes were coded and analyzed for applicability to the research 
questions, the elements were sorted and combined as potential solution sets for the 
research questions.  Subsequently, each solution set was analyzed and evaluated for 
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relevance to the research questions and then drafted as subcomponents of the emergent 
theses.  Lastly, the component parts of the coded and analyzed research were grouped, 
ordered, and ultimately prioritized according to the analytical arguments and evidence 
discovered.  
Analysis of this data within the context of  the research questions resulted in the 
hypothesis that while certain expected functions of intelligence were universal 
(mitigating surprise, reducing uncertainty, etc.) homeland security leaders have differing 
expected applications (use) for intelligence depending on their own roles within the 
homeland security enterprise (political, operational or tactical).  The use of grounded 
theory supported the evolution of the hypotheses that use of intelligence can have 
political, legal, psychological, and even barter value in addition to more commonly 
appreciated.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The broad and eclectic nature of this research provided both a unique opportunity 
and a considerable challenge in relation to analyzing such an expansive topic aperture of 
literary and media sampling. The research literature was classed for analysis into two 
primary categories: 1) reasons why intelligence may be useful in acquiring and 
maintaining homeland security decision advantage and, 2) the identification and 
examination of potential derived benefits of intelligence-based homeland security 
advantage.   
The topical areas reviewed were: 1) the use of intelligence as a practice and as a 
process, 2) homeland security generally, 3) homeland security intelligence, 4) decision 
science and psychology, 5) law and policy, and 6) political applications.  
1. Literature on the Use of Intelligence  
The volume of literature with respect to the production of intelligence for national 
security decision making is generous (Treverton & Gabbard, 2008; Reveron 2007).  This 
literature commonly falls into roughly one of two categories, 1) the field of intelligence 
as a practice (production and analysis) or, 2) historical and reform driven literature.  The 
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largest sample of literature suggesting specific reasons decision makers would want or 
need to adopt intelligence as a factor in their decision-making, relied chiefly upon 
biographical anecdotes, not quantitative research (McNeil, 2008). Much has been written 
on how to “fix” intelligence, yet little scholarship exists on how to implement this “fixed” 
intelligence into homeland security decision-making processes, especially in 
organizations that have not previously been involved in using intelligence as a factor in 
decision making (Treverton, 2001).  
The most prolific arguments for the use of intelligence in decision making 
appeared targeted toward military and national security decision-making policy and 
doctrine (Department of Defense [DoD], 2008; Department of the Army, 1994; Wolgast, 
2005). Other than exhortations to use and engage the intelligence community, this 
literature review was notably devoid of suggestions for practical reasons or coherent 
correlations for homeland security decision makerss on how they might use intelligence 
(Steele-Vivas, 1996; Langerman, 2007).  
2. Literature on Homeland Security Policy and Intelligence Generally   
The National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Department of Homeland 
Security Intelligence Strategy provide the most comprehensive government literature on 
federal government policies with regard to situations homeland security leaders may seek 
to incorporate intelligence (White House, 2007; DHS, 2006).  However, neither of these 
documents specifically articulate the benefits (or value) of incorporating intelligence into 
decision-making scenarios.   
3. Literature on Intelligence in Support of Homeland Security 
Objectives Generally 
In order to successfully prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks, homeland security 
decision makers at all levels require timely, accurate, and useful threat knowledge 
specifically tailored to their decision spaces.  Published government plans and policies 
and scholarly literature on homeland security prevention tactics, techniques, procedures 
and policy are underwhelming in their lack of attention to the role intelligence can play at 
the state, local, and tribal levels.  The National Strategy (White House, 2008) spends a 
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mere eight of 53 pages discussing prevention and disruption policy, but mentions 
intelligence only six times, all of those references within the section on disrupting 
terrorists within the United States.  The lack of progressive application of intelligence 
with community-wide prevention efforts may be indicative of both high-level policy 
ambivalence as to the value of intelligence in preventing terrorism and a widespread 
misunderstanding of how intelligence can proactively shape prevention decisions at 
tactical and operational level.   
4. Literature on Intelligence in Support of Homeland Security 
Prevention Efforts 
According to national level plans and doctrine, in order to offer adequate 
protection, first policy makers must initially decide both what to protect, and from which 
threat to focus the protection against (DHS, 2007).  Again, intelligence is woefully 
underrepresented in the policy literature on both aspects in the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (White House, 2008).  While a host of homeland security threats are 
widely discussed by name (including infectious diseases and catastrophic public health 
threats, and attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources) no mention was 
found of the value of incorporating intelligence on those threats into protection planning 
or efforts (DHS, 2007).  
5. Literature on Intelligence and Homeland Security Response 
A significant body of literature has been generated regarding the policies and 
strategic solutions developed by the government in partnership with state and local 
agencies to respond uniformly (such as the National Incident Management System 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2003) and the National Response 
Framework (FEMA, 2008)); however, the value of incorporating intelligence into 
response options and activities is referred to peripherally as obtaining situational 
awareness (FEMA, 2009).  Several authors have explored and advocated for the potential 
for military intelligence support (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets and 
personnel) for “battle damage assessment” type assistance in order to provide situational 
awareness to commanders (Anderson, 2005).  This literature, however, centers 
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predominantly within The Department of Defense (DoD, 2006) and United States 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and Department of Homeland Security 
intelligence collection and analysis efforts with a focus on meeting the strategic 
intelligence requirements of national level decision makers first, and operational and 
tactical level decision makers on an “ad hoc” basis. 
6. Literature on Homeland Security Intelligence  
Literature on homeland security intelligence, as a practice, seems to mirror that of 
the other intelligence writing with regard to the application of intelligence to the 
decision-making process. This ought not to be surprising since a significant segment of 
the intelligence literature drafted after 9/11 was written by authors and academics 
laboring in the same or similar fields prior to 9/11.  I found Gregory Treverton’s (2009) 
book Intelligence in an Age of Terror the most noteworthy post-9/11 manuscript 
regarding the use of intelligence within the current political and operational 
environments.  
As for literature suggesting explicit rationale why homeland security leaders 
specifically should value intelligence, none was identified.   
7. Literature on the Decision Sciences  
The decision sciences provide seemingly endless models on how to improve 
decision quality; however, no literature was noted suggesting any specific research or 
commentary on how homeland security decision makers across the spectrum are 
integrating intelligence into their decision-making processes (Masse, 2006).  On its face, 
decision science provides little insight into how intelligence specifically can be used to 
improve homeland security decisions.  Decision science did provide scientific evidence 
that was used by extrapolation as reasoning for the use of intelligence to improve 
decision-making generally (Krawchuk, 2000; Davis, Kulick & Enger, 2009).  Various 
threat and opportunity models were also examined, that when carried by extension to the 
homeland security decision space, may provide sound reasons for incorporating 
intelligence (Shambach, 1996; Mitchell & Decker, 2004).  The field of decision science is 
amply populated with literature on incorporating various factors into the decision-making 
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process, but the field is noticeably silent on the incorporation of threat knowledge per se 
(Zsambok, Klein & Beach, 1992).  The fundamentals from which the author’s adaptive 
threat orientation model are derived spring from military strategist John Boyd’s (1995) 
“Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop” or “OODA” Loop. 
E. REASONS FOR INTELLIGENCE USE 
1. Legal Reasons for Intelligence Use 
Although secondary in impact to the operational security objectives of homeland 
security leaders, the legal and political uses of intelligence should be regarded as both 
valid and invaluable reasons to use intelligence. 
As a nation of laws, leaders, practitioners, and citizens are expected to operate 
within the bounds of the law.  A review of intelligence law uncovered a wealth of 
opportunities and restrictions for the access and incorporation of intelligence into 
decision-making processes.  The Intelligence Community Legal Desk Reference (Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2007) and the legal treatise National 
Security Law (Dycus, Berny, Banks, & Raven-Hanse, 2002) provided rich statutory, 
common law, and commentary for the legal applications of intelligence.   
A healthy and passionate debate can be found with regard to the issue of domestic 
intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination, with equally enlivened arguments on 
either side.  Intelligence law literature was classed into statutory, executive branch 
(administrative rulemaking), common law (rulings of the court), or commentary on any 
or all of the aforementioned writings. 
2. Political Reasons for Intelligence Use 
Most of the literature reviewed on the political use of intelligence was generally 
of a conspiratorial, or “exposé” nature, suggesting that the use of intelligence for political 
purposes is disfavored by scholars and citizens alike (Warrick, 2008; Lawson, 2008).  
Withholding moral judgment on the political uses of intelligence, it is important to note 
that while much of the popular literature and media disfavored the use of intelligence for 
purposes other than security, many political scientists and  communication theorists 
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propose a rather “to the victor--the spoils” attitude of parties in power using all methods 
within their power to retain such power, intelligence being no more immune than any 
other information that might further the interests of the moving political party (Cutler, 
1993).  Angelo Codevilla’s Informing Statecraft (2002) was an excellent resource in 
describing potential opportunities within the U.S. State department and U.S. Senate on 
how intelligence might be of use to policy makers within their respective roles. 
F. FUTURE RESEARCH  
This thesis may be useful in shaping future discussion and research on the topics 
of the practice, use of information sharing systems and products, intelligence gathering, 
intelligence analysis, and incorporating intelligence into homeland security decisions.  
This thesis may also drive much needed focused research on the impact of homeland 
security intelligence requirements on the intelligence community as well as, the security, 
technological, or policy implications of expanded incorporation of intelligence into other 
non-homeland security decision processes. 
By examining and parsing out critical elements of what a successful intelligence 
incorporation model might include, homeland security leaders may in turn leverage these 
“proto-doctrine” building blocks to create their own intelligence incorporation doctrine 
according to their own specific homeland security responsibilities and constraints instead 
of pursuing a “one size fits all” federally mandated or nationally propagated homeland 
security intelligence (HSINT) doctrine. 
Scrutinizing the value of intelligence from the production perspective may also 
provide impetus for the Intelligence Community to adjust their collective cultural 
paradigm away from a mindset of “production” of homeland security intelligence as if it 
were a just another product, to a new standard of intelligence as a process of orientation 
to a threat or opportunity.  Additional research into emerging intelligence application 
foci, departing from a product foucs, and leaning towards the actual use, implementation, 
and impact of knowledge and understanding of a threat or opportunity within the decision 
space of a particular homeland security leader may also greatly benefit both communities.    
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G. INTENDED CONSUMER  
The intended audiences for this research are homeland security leaders and 
practitioners interested in improving their decision quality; who may, or may not, have 
experience as a consumer or participant in the intelligence process.  Other individuals that 
may benefit from these ideas are homeland security and intelligence community leaders, 
and policy makers tasked to provide value-added intelligence products, systems, and 
programs to the homeland security community.   
The remainder of this thesis is organized in three chapters: 1) the role of 
intelligence in homeland security, 2) how homeland security decision advantage is 
acquired and maintained, and 3) an examination of the specific derived benefits of 
intelligence-based decision advantage for homeland security.  
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II. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN HOMELAND SECURITY  
The key to intelligence-driven victories may not be the collection of 
objective ‘truth’ so much as the gaining of an information edge or 
competitive advantage over an adversary.  Such an advantage can dissolve 
a decision maker’s quandary and allow him to act.  This ability to 
lubricate choice is the real objective of intelligence [emphasis added]. 
Jennifer Sims (ODNI, 2008, p. 8)  
A. OVERVIEW 
Intelligence cannot eliminate uncertainty in the unordered decision space that is 
homeland security.  This is an unattainable and unrealistic objective, as the unknown 
factors driving change within the space include the thoughts and intentions of small 
groups of highly networked individuals, or even solitary actors.  Intelligence is valuable 
when it contributes to a threat understanding “end state” wherein “uncertainties about the 
adversary and anxieties about vulnerabilities should lessen” (Turner, 2005, p. 6). Turner 
(2005, p. 13) continues, adding that intelligence increases its value by “tempering” 
uncertainty when the collective intelligence efforts have  “reduce(d) uncertainty…to the 
extent that viable options and opportunities are identifiable and made available for policy 
leaders.”  
The value of intelligence to homeland security decision makers may be succinctly 
categorized into three benefit classes: 1) define the proximate threat reality, 2) mitigate 
the negative effects of surprise by facilitating foreknowledge of the threat, and 3) 
optimize homeland security opportunities, policy and resources within the threat 
environment.  Decisions in the uncertain homeland security threat environment require 
judgment, and judgment with the benefit of tailored, timely and accurate intelligence can 




B. CRITICAL TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Certain terms and definitions will be used throughout this thesis, many of which 
have different meanings in practice across the many disciplines of homeland security and 
intelligence.  In the interest of consistency the following terms will be used throughout 
this thesis according to the definitions provided.  
• Threat: A potential for an individual or group to exercise an action that 
exploits vulnerability.  It does not automatically imply the level of danger 
that exists (Dictionary.com, 2010). 
• Vulnerability: A flaw or weakness that can be exploited by an attacker 
(Dictionary.com, 2010) 
• Risk: The probability of harmful consequences arising from an action 
taken by a source to exploit a known vulnerability (Quiggin, 2007, p. 25).  
• Decision Advantage: the circumstance or factors that place one in a 
favorable position in relation to the judgment associated with coming to a 
conclusion or determination (Aftergood, 2008).  
• Intelligence: Intelligence is the process and products that account for how 
an organization knows about threats prior to direct contact with the threat 
(Author, 2010).  
• The United States Code (50 U.S.C. §401a(5)) is helpful in illuminating the 
legal definition of national (but not homeland security) intelligence as:  
information gathered within or outside the United States, that 
pertains…to more than one…agency; and that involves threats to 
the United States, its people, property, or interests; the 
development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; 
or any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland 
security. 
• Value of intelligence: Value can be defined as the worth, or importance, 
or usefulness of something to somebody (Encarta.com, 2010). When 
intelligence is valued decision makers find the costs associated with threat 
observation and orientation worth the benefits derived from the resultant 
threat understanding and potential decision advantage.  
How threat knowledge is used (or disregarded) by decision makers is not 
intelligence, but rather a function of decision-making processes (Wheaton, 
2010).   
• Role of intelligence: A role can be defined as a specific function, the 
usual or expected function of something, or part something plays in an 
action or event (Encarta.com, 2010).  As such, the role of intelligence in 
acquiring and maintaining decision advantage is only one of many usual 
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or expected functions necessary for advantage to occur. The purpose or 
function to which homeland security leaders employ or accept intelligence 
as part of their decision-making processes will depend directly upon the 
decision makers experience and understanding of intelligence, homeland 
security, and threats.  
C. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE—TO WHAT END? 
Seekers of Wisdom first need sound intelligence  
Heraclitus  
The Department of Homeland Security asserts that intelligence is central to 
“everything homeland security does”  (Allen, 2006, p. 2); yet the intelligence branch of 
the Department of Homeland security receives a pittance of the national intelligence 
budget and is held with minimal regard within the intelligence community (Gorman, 
2005). Factors such as this suggest an inconsistency between what the homeland security 
community writ large says about intelligence, and the actual role of intelligence in how 
homeland decisions are being made and the amount of value the homeland security 
community expects or derives from intelligence it receives.  Contrary to the rhetoric, 
revolutionary improvements to homeland security decisions cannot come from improved 
intelligence alone; this progress can only come from improved homeland security 
decisions. “Fixing” homeland security intelligence, will not “fix” homeland security.  
While it is true that “better” intelligence may result in a more informed intelligence 
community, without “better” use of intelligence by homeland security decision makers 
the opportunity for improved homeland security decisions may be wasted. The answer to 
“homeland security intelligence, so what?” must unequivocally be “decision advantage.”  
Homeland security is not “national security-lite,” and the static and symmetric 
security policies, doctrines, and practices that served the nation widely and well during 
the Cold War are wholly inadequate in their unaltered or mismatched application within 
the contemporary homeland security domain.  A very real concern is threats previously 
considered uncommon within the U.S. (such as weapons of mass destruction or terrorist 
attacks against civilians) are largely being addressed by common responses, without 
acknowledging either the complexity or consequences of these new threats or the 
potential opportunities for optimization of resources and policy.  The “new” homeland 
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security reality is one of asymmetric threats with potential catastrophic consequences that 
previously had been considered exclusively foreign threats (to be dealt with “over 
there”).  Advantageous homeland security policies require new thinking about these new 
challenges, within a relatively new threat environment—American soil.  Homeland 
security intelligence (HSINT) is both the manner and mechanism by which the American 
people, public and private industry, and government homeland security leaders and 
practitioners can acquire and maintain domestic threat understanding.  After considering 
why intelligence is critical to informed security judgments, homeland security decision 
makers may more artfully and effectively entertain options for, when, where, and how 
they will plan, program, train for and execute the inclusion of intelligence in their own 
decision processes.    
D. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE (HSINT) SUMMARIZED 
• Homeland security intelligence is threat data and information that has been 
analyzed and deemed significant to the goals and purposes of homeland 
security decision makers. It is knowledge about adversary capabilities and 
intentions beyond a homeland security decision maker’s control or 
common experience.  HSINT is both the process and products within the 
scope of knowledge related to homeland security threats.  
• Homeland security intelligence is derived from multiple collection means 
and sources and typically specializes in using “dirty” data (incomplete, 
unstructured, and deceptive) as a basis for analysis and assessments. 
HSINT is more than just “secret” intelligence; it relies on observation and 
orientation (analysis) from across the homeland security and national 
security enterprises, as well as private sector, media information.  
• Homeland security intelligence primary operational role is to reduce the 
level of uncertainty within the homeland security decision space. More 
than “pure research” or “pure journalistic reporting,” HSINT must support 




III. ACQUIRING AND MAINTAINING INTELLIGENCE-BASED 
HOMELAND SECURITY DECISION ADVANTAGE  
Decision advantage results in the ability of the United States to bring 
instruments of national power to bear in ways that resolve challenges, 
defuse crises, or deflect emerging threats.  
Jennifer Sims (ODNI, 2008, p. 8) 
A. GENERATING DECISION ADVANTAGE: FROM OBSERVATION TO 
ADVANTAGE  
The value of decision advantage in violent contests has been established since the 
very earliest records of the physical struggles of man (Sun Tzu, 2002). Mansdorf and 
Kedar (2008) assert in the contemporary homeland security threat environment the 
asymmetric nature of the terrorist threat presents an extreme example of the importance 
of understanding well ones’ adversary, as knowledge, not forces or logistics is the life 
blood of asymmetric struggle. In order to effectively combat asymmetric adversaries, 
homeland security leaders and practitioners must organize and plan homeland security 
strategies and policies, as well as recruit, train and equip personnel able to optimize 
knowledge of the adversary while denying the enemy as much information as possible 
that may be advantageous to their adversary’s desired effects.   
Homeland security decision advantage results in the ability of homeland security 
enterprise leaders and practitioners to bring instruments of national, state, local, tribal, 
private enterprise, and individual citizen powers to bear in ways that resolve homeland 
security challenges, defuse homeland security crises, or detect and neutralize emerging 
homeland security threats.  Although a term of relatively new usage for intelligence 
professionals and security decision makers, decision advantage is now considered the 




B. THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE FOR DECISION ADVANTAGE 
The root challenge facing our security apparatus is uncertainty.   
Richard A. Posner (2005, p. 2) 
Homeland security leaders and practitioners (collectively) lack neither the 
cognitive capacity nor active interest in threats to perform their own analysis, 
nevertheless in a crisis situation, they are not likely to have the time, accesses or luxury 
of singly focusing attention on those threats.  The sheer volume of threat data and 
intelligence produced in response to a homeland security event could easily overwhelm 
anyone unaccustomed to distinguishing consumer specific threat signals from the “noise” 
of the strategic, operational or tactical environment.   
In the complex homeland security environment, it is a leader’s and practitioner’s 
attention, not intellect or information may be the asset of greatest demand when 
attempting to navigate within a constantly changing threatscape. The most inopportune 
time to become aware of or oriented to an imminent threat may very well be at the same 
time one is trying to coordinate ongoing prevention, protection, or response operations. 
The demands on time and attention necessary to observe and orient to threat 
developments within the threatscape, present possibly the single greatest justification for 
why homeland security leaders and practitioners need to rely on intelligence 
professionals to assist them in acquiring and maintaining an adaptive threat orientation.   
Intelligence plays a critical role in determining how homeland security decision 
makers become aware of threats within their operating environment. The following 
analysis examines principles by which homeland security leaders and practitioners may 
rely upon to convert intelligence into decision advantage.  
C. FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION ADVANTAGE: FROM DATA TO 
VALUE 
Intelligence produces masses of data, the import of which is clear only to 
people educated to understand it.  
Angelo Codevilla (2002, p. 15) 
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1. Intelligence Creation Process  
The production of intelligence is a three part process: 1) data is collected through 
observation, 2) that data is converted into information by analysis and the 3) analysis 
becomes potential understanding to an intelligence consumer through creation of a 
deliverable (report or briefing) that can be applied to a specific decision or problem set 
within the threat environment (Quiggin, 2007, p. 52) (see Figure 1).  
Table 1.   Intelligence Creation Process (After Codevilla, 2002, p. 52) 
Data:  most basic form of observation/collection; has not undergone any form or 
processing or analysis  
Information:  Primary level of processing, organized in such a way as a human being 
can derive benefit from exposure.  
Knowledge:  the application or judgment of information in the context of previously 
understood information. 
Understanding: an appreciation for causal and consequential relationships between 
information through application. 
Threat factors “known” (i.e., observed and analyzed) by the intelligence 
producers but “unknown” (i.e., not disseminated or understood within the context of the 
organizational objectives) to decision makers not only frustrates the purpose for 
intelligence in the first place, it can result in unnecessary and potentially catastrophic 
errors of judgment, either due to lack of threat understanding or in unnecessary 




Figure 1.   Intelligence Data to Action Model (From Cox, 2004, p. 11) 
After knowledge has been created and to be valuable to decision makers, it must 
be brokered, bundled, exported, imported and then presented to a decision maker for 
consideration (Deptula, 2008).  Arguably, the most significant failures and 
inconsistencies in the security community are in the brokering, bundling, exporting, 
importing and presenting of knowledge to decision makers, not in the creation of more 
knowledge.  Inversely, the greatest opportunities for revolutionary advances in improved 
homeland security decision making may be derived from improved brokering, bundling, 
exporting, importing and presenting of knowledge to decision makers, not in the creation 
of more knowledge (see Figure 2).  An unwarranted amount of focus within the 
intelligence community appears to be on observation and production of reports, and not 
on the actual orientation of decision makerss to that threat knowledge (Sims, 2007, p. 8).   
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Figure 2.   Intelligence Value to Effort Ratio Model (From Deptula, 2008) 
If intelligence is “central to everything” that homeland security leaders and 
practitioners do, then these decision makers must create and resource adequate programs 
and processes designed to not create threat more knowledge but to optimize the impact 
of threat understanding across the homeland security decision space.  
D. MAINTAINING DECISION ADVANTAGE REQUIRES AN ADAPTIVE 
THREAT ORIENTATION  
The homeland security decision-making environment is a complex and dynamic 
environment as data in relation to potential threats is deliberately deceptive or difficult to 
observe, and the threat, left unchecked has the potential for great destruction or 
disturbance, often without warning.  Homeland security decision makers with an 
appreciation for the value of intelligence will rely on trained threat observation and 
orientation professionals to continually survey the threat environment with the specific 
objective of ultimately not producing reports, but orienting specific decision makers to 
specific threat dispositions as the tactical, operational, or strategic circumstances dictate.  
Homeland security decision makers may then integrate this understanding into their 
efforts to determine potential challenges or opportunities, gauge the expected efficacy of 
current or pending security efforts, evaluate probability of desired outcomes within the 
threat environment, consider potential courses of action in light of the changes within the 
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threat environment, decide on courses of action, and then guide into action in light of the 
threat’s capabilities, limitations and intent.   
1. Towards An Adaptive Threat Orientation  
Decision makerss do not need the broadest range of possibilities; they 
need a relevant range of the most likely probabilities. The intelligence 
process produces such a range.  
Brigadier General James Cox (2004, p. 19) 
If the purpose of intelligence is to orient decision makers to the threats within a 
given environment, programs and processes must be developed and implemented that 
create a sustainable level of orientation in light of changes within that environment. 
Homeland security decision makers that pursue and adopt an adaptive threat orientation 
to maintain their decision advantage are more likely to acquire and preserve a timely and 
accurate threat understanding, than those who do not.  With this flexible and adaptive 
understanding these leaders and practitioners will be more aware of and thus have a more 
proximate understanding of the risks to his or her organizational objectives prior to 
engaging in his or her decision-making processes. As such, these decision makers stand a 
much better chance of more capably arriving at risk based decisions and maximizing the 
homeland security resources and opportunities than those who do not seek or provide for 
this adaptive threat understanding standard.     
Without the use of intelligence, chance may take the place of knowledge, and 
waste the place of economy.  Therefore, an operational “end” for homeland security 
intelligence is in the creation and maintenance of sustainable decision advantage against 
threats to homeland security objectives through an adaptive threat orientation.   
2. The Value of Adaptive Threat Orientation in Sustaining Decision 
Advantage  
The judgment of a trained and experienced mind will be more likely to get 
things right then the judgment of a mind lacking those qualities.  
Walter Laqueur (1999, p. 308) 
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An adaptive threat orientation is a threat ontology framed to quickly “create 
domain-level context that enables users to attach rich domain specific information and 
additional annotations to intelligence information” (Raghu, Ramesh, & Winston, 2005, p. 
312). Because this orientation “posture” is adaptive, it is never complete but requires 
continuous observation of the operational environment, actively seeking threat signature 
information from all available indicators that may drive adjustments within the 
organizations’ operations or resource allocation according to the changed conditions.   
Decisions are made in light of the threat and driven by security goals that exist because of 
known or anticipated threats within a specified homeland security environment.  Since an 
adaptive threat orientation is as much the capacity to acquire and apply threat knowledge 
within an organizational decision space for the purpose of attaining decision advantage as 
it is a desired end state, an adaptive threat orientation can become both a goal and a 
framework from which decision makers can organize their intelligence operations 
(observation and orientation).   
3. Why Adaptive? 
The threat environment of homeland security is laden with uncertainty and rapidly 
changing unordered challenges. As such, many homeland security threats do not submit 
to data for analysis as more symmetric or ordered challenges might. Unordered 
challenges do not have “yes or no” answers that can be deduced from the facts, due to the 
swift rate of change and the deliberate obscurity of the factors upon which decisions 
might be based. In order to best posture potential security courses of action for success, 
homeland security decision makers must realize that “the right answer” to security 
questions only remains “right” as long as the threat factors from which that decision is 
was based upon remain unchanged. Change in the homeland security environment can 
occur as fast as potential threat actors are able to think and communicate. 
The asymmetry and intrinsic adaptability of homeland security threat tactics, 
techniques and procedures, in addition to seemingly limitless targeting possibilities, 
demands sound homeland security policies, tactics and procedures be equally as adaptive 
as the threats they face. Both decision makers and intelligence professionals must 
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understand and operationalize practices conducive to the principle that intelligence is 
only “good” for as long as the observations and analysis by which it was created remain 
unchanged.  A central role of intelligence is to track (i.e. observe) and inform (i.e. orient) 
when these changes occur, especially those changes with immediate or significant 
consequences within a homeland security decision maker’s decision space.  Without 
intelligence there is no foreknowledge of the threat.  Without foreknowledge of the threat 
there can be no threat orientation.  In the absence of this orientation, security decisions 
may be made without regard to the very threats they contend to address.  
Complex dynamic systems theories, like the adaptive threat orientation, provide 
an example of a pragmatic foundation for thinking about the homeland security threat 
environment (Abraham, 1998). The hyper-consequential homeland security environment 
mixes both complexity (and as a result uncertainty) and dynamism in a way uncommon 
in contemporary U.S. domestic security.  Complex dynamic systems are better suited to 
account for the one extremely important aspect of the environment that linear and cause-
effect models fail to realize: environmental rate of change (Underwood, 2002). When 
dealing with the uncertainty of terrorism or other homeland security threats, not having 
an adaptive mindset can hamstring, if not cripple, decision makers when threat changes 
inevitably manifest within the homeland security environment.   
4. Decision Advantage and Psychological Enabling  
Intelligence remains information, no matter how adroitly collected, and no 
matter how well analyzed, until it is lodged between the ears of a decision 
maker.   
General Paul Gorman (USA Ret) (Senate Hearing, 1992, p. 262) 
One of the foremost values of intelligence to the homeland security community is 
to prepare the minds of decision makers operating within this specific and unique threat 
environment of the inherent threat variables and potential consequences of security 
actions (from the adversary’s perspective) taken within those threat circumstances.  Even 
with an adaptive understanding of the threat (and how that threat applies to the decision 
space), significant psychological barriers may exist, which if not overcome, can also lead 
to suboptimal decision outcomes. By understanding threats within a perspective of 
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awareness and orientation, decision makers can avoid falling into the “connect the dots” 
fallacy so commonly referred to as a function of intelligence (Mata, 2010).  Because 
homeland security organizations seek to achieve their objectives within a rapidly 
changing operational environment, often pitted against highly adaptive adversaries with 
competing or destructive intent, there is no static “picture” per se that intelligence 
professionals can form by “connecting the dots.”  The “threat picture” can change as 
rapidly and often as the tactical, operational and strategic environments change, 
potentially at the speed of thought when it comes to intentions or targeting.  The 
importance of intelligence in overcoming negative psychological effects will be 
examined further as an independent benefit of intelligence-based decision advantage.  
5. Decision Advantage and the “Observation and Orientation Decide Act 
Loop” 
In his revolutionary presentation Organic Design for Command and Control 
(1995), military strategist John Boyd proposed the key to decisive combat success was 
not in strength or power ratios but in the maneuverability, speed and nimbleness in which 
decision makers could observe and orient themselves to the environment and make 
decisions and take action according to that environment.  This decision-making paradigm 
flew in the face of hundreds of years of western military doctrine (e.g., Clausewitz) and 
legitimized within the United States military establishment the more eastern focused 
theories that centered on “out thinking” rather than “out gunning” ones’ adversaries.  
The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop (Figure 3) is the diagram that 
encompasses Boyd’s decision theory.  In the “hurry up and do something” environment 
that too often grips the homeland security community, the OODA loop offers unique 
insight into the importance of the intelligence functions of observation and orientation.   
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Figure 3.   Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop (From Boyd, 1995) 
According to Boyd:  
The second O, orientation—as the repository of our genetic heritage, 
cultural tradition, and previous experiences—is the most important part of 
the OODA loop since it shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, 
the way we act. (1995, slide 4)   
In the context of homeland security decision making, the value of intelligence as 
orientation is in swiftly and wholly incorporating changes within the threat environment, 
moving intelligence “inside” the loop and actually adopting it as part of the way 
homeland security decision makers think about the decisions they make and the 
consequences of actions taken. 
6. Decision Advantage and the Orientation Gap within the Intelligence 
Cycle 
The final stage of the “official” intelligence cycle is the dissemination phase 
(Krizan, 1997, p. 7).  As soon as reports are delivered and “intelligence needs” 
(requirements) are met, the process resets to meet other intelligence needs and assumes 
upon delivery, that the intelligence obligation is met.  This “result” puts more of a focus 
on production and dissemination of information than orientation about what the 
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intelligence might actually mean for that decision maker in the context of their specific 
threatscape and objectives.  Reasons for this arm’s length association abound; but most 
stem from a fear that too close of a affiliation between decision makers and threat 
information providers will somehow skew the intelligence to suit decision maker’s 
desired outcomes(Kent, 2003). This “delivery” process has significant limitations for 
homeland security decision makers because of the steep learning curve and breakneck 
speed of change associated with homeland security threats.  Intelligence, whether as 
product or process, is not self-evident or self-executing.  For homeland security leaders 
unfamiliar with the intelligence process or unpracticed in relying on rapidly changing or 
imperfect threat information in a decision process, the mere delivery and possession of 
intelligence does not help to create threat understanding and is therefore of limited or 
even negative value if decision makers have an unrealistic expectation of intelligence or 
they are “holding out” for “smoking gun” type intelligence that may never manifest.   
In much the same way it would be inappropriate for homeland security lawyers to 
respond to legal questions pertaining to the homeland security decision space by dropping 
case law or statutes on a decision makers’ desk and then retreat back to their offices to 
research and draft more memos, it is likewise absurd to assume that the intelligence 
function of orientation can be accomplished by dumping intelligence reports on a 
decision makers’ desk or inbox and then retreating back to produce more reports.  
Constant and robust dialog between decision makers and intelligence professionals 
regarding both changes within the security operations environment, and changes within 
the threat environment is incontrovertibly critical to the successful optimization of 
intelligence within homeland security efforts to achieve decision advantage.  The 
analytical bridge spanning the gap between knowledge creation and homeland security 
decision advantage is the acquisition and maintenance of an adaptive threat orientation.   
7. Decision Advantage: Summary 
The value of decision advantage should be of paramount importance to homeland 
security leaders and practitioners. In the highly complex and consequential environment 
that is homeland security, no advantage can be ceded to the adversary. Like intelligence, 
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decision advantage for its own sake is without impact. Decision must lead to action, and 
action must yield desired effect to be considered successful.  
The following section identifies and examines six derived benefits of intelligence-




IV. SIX DERIVED BENEFITS OF INTELLIGENCE BASED 
DECISION ADVANTAGE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
We have to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it. No 
magic, no code, or otherwise will provide certainty. Our plans must work 
without it.  
Roberta Wohlstetter (1962, p. 400) 
This section identifies and elaborates on six specific categories of benefit is 
homeland security leaders and practitioners might expect from intelligence-based 
decision advantage. I submit the homeland security enterprise should fund, organize, 
equip, train, and rely on intelligence for six primary purposes: 
1. To mitigate the negative effects of surprise,  
2. Depict proximate reality,  
3. Optimize resources,  
4. Make risk-based policy and legal decisions,  
5. Overcome detrimental psychological and decision biases and,  
6. Provide commodity and symbolic value to homeland security intelligence 
consumers.  
Additionally, these “fruits” of intelligence can provide consumers with a context 
from which they can measure the effectiveness and value of the intelligence support they 
receive.  Consumers may evaluate intelligence within this framework as well as provide 
specific feedback to homeland security intelligence producers as to the detailed efficacy 
of certain products or reports. 
If not for the uncertainty inherent to the homeland security environment, the costs 
in resources and potential limitation of liberties proposed by the security community may 
be difficult to justify.  The first part of this section seeks to define and examine the 
specific values of intelligence as a “tempering” agent in a chaotic and untempered 
decision space.   
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A. MITIGATE SURPRISE 
A commander may be excused for being defeated but never for being surprised.  
U.S. Army Cavalry Manual (Department of the Army, 1935 p. 5) 
The primary benefits of homeland security intelligence in mitigating surprise are 
two-fold: 1) the value of warning of imminent adversary activity within the homeland 
security environment, and 2) the value of intelligence as it relates to anticipating 
potential future adversary courses of action.  
1. Intelligence and Warning in Homeland Security  
The decisive test for any intelligence agency is to warn…of trouble before 
it occurs. 
Walter Laqueur (1985, p. 21) 
Perhaps the single greatest burden borne by the homeland security intelligence 
community is that of warning homeland security leaders and practitioners of imminent 
danger to lives or property. Without the benefit of understanding the intelligence 
capabilities and limitations of observation (collection) and analysis and dissemination 
(orientation), homeland security decision makers run the risk of having either unrealistic 
expectations of “just in time” tactical warnings or perhaps underestimate the extensive 
value intelligence warning can have at levels below or beyond the national level and 
within homeland security decision spaces not traditionally considered intelligence 
consumers.   
Intelligence commentator Gregory Treverton (2009, p. 29) suggests this potential 
frustration is due to the fact that “state and local officials are unfamiliar with the products 
of national intelligence agencies and are prone to imagine (or hope) that there is magic 
behind the green door of classification, only the feds would open it.” In the opposite, the 
intelligence community continually asserts they are not in the business of clairvoyance 
and must rely upon indications (observable activity that can be analyzed for relevance) 
prior to being able to provide any sort of valuable warning (Magnuson, 2010). The 
expectation of clairvoyance and omniscience may be the single greatest obstacle to 
optimizing intelligence within homeland security. Too many homeland security 
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intelligence consumers seem to expect “the answer” in an environment that not only rules 
out the certainty of “the answer” but obscures the very signals from which “an answer” 
may spring.  
2. Mitigate Surprise: Anticipate to Optimize Response 
Providing warning is the intelligence officer’s most difficult task.  The 
devil is partly in the details: it is impossible to preempt a threat without 
knowledge of the specific plot or plots, and it is almost impossible to 
unearth all of them. 
James W. Harris (2002, p. 3) 
In order to maximize the warning value of intelligence, political psychologist 
Alex Hybel stresses the need for a paradigm shift away from avoiding surprises to being 
able to react effectively: “There is no sure method for avoiding surprise.  But it is 
possible to minimize surprise by understanding the circumstances under which it might 
be sought, the variety of obstacles that must be surmounted in order to achieve different 
surprises and the types of steps that must be taken to overcome such obstacles” (as 
quoted by Quiggen, 2007, p. 55).  With a realistic expectation of the capabilities and 
limitations of intelligence for purposes of warning, homeland security leaders and 
practitioners can continually orient their homeland security intelligence efforts and 
expectations away from predicting adversary activity within the homeland security 
environment toward observation of threat indicators (circumstances, elements, and 
obstacles) that may orient homeland security practitioners and leaders to the impending 
security threats in such a way as these decision makers are prepared to act or react to 
adversary activity in the event of engagement.  
3. Intelligence and Managing Expectations: Estimates and Predictions   
History does not encourage potential victims of surprise attack.  One can 
only hope to reduce the severity—to be only partly surprised, to issue 
clearer warnings, to gain a few days for better preparations and to be 
more adequately prepared to minimize the damage once a surprise attack 
occurs.  
Ephraim Kam (1998, p. 223) 
 30
No intelligence program in existence today can be said to have a uniform process 
by which estimations can be generated with enough certainty to be considered 
“predicted.”  The problem with security predictions is it is literally impossible to predict 
the future no matter how much data is obtained or how much human analysis or 
computation is done (Quiggin, 2007).   
The reasons it is impossible to predict the future in a security environment include 
the issues of constancy of variables and the interplay between variables in an open system 
(Quiggin, 2007).  Chaos theory suggests that similar outcomes can only be predicted in a 
system where the same variables occur in the same order in the same environment 
(Kellert, 1993).  Because the security environment is an “open” system wherein interact 
100s if not 1000s of different operating variables, those few instances where predictions 
do come to fruition are most likely to be either overly vague as to be of little use to 
decision makers, or just plain lucky.  According to strategic intelligence and security 
theorist Thomas Quiggin (2007, p. 42), “With only ten different dots to connect, there 
would be a total of forty-five different dot patterns that could be created. What is 
stunning, however, is that the ten dots and forty-five patterns can produce 3.47 trillion 
different outcomes.” 
Laqueur (1985, p. 42) suggests the impossibility of prediction in a security 
environment derives from lack of continuity and the limits of extrapolation: “Because 
prediction is impossible without at least some measure of extrapolation, and because 
extrapolation does not work without at least some continuity, prediction becomes most 
difficult when it is needed most—at a time of rapid or radical change.”  
Time and energy spent attempting to predict homeland security incidents may 
result in much needed analytical capability wasted, chasing the impossible.  Analyst and 
decision maker time and energy is much better applied to creating an understanding of 
the threat environment at large and in creating awareness within a decision maker’s 
process that promotes informed and well reasoned solutions to potential problems and 
solutions before they occur. 
 31
4. Summary: The Value of Intelligence in Mitigating Surprise  
Surprise…arises in reality from difficulties of comprehension.   
Angelo Codevilla (2002, p. 260) 
Of all the demands heaped upon the homeland security intelligence community, 
the greatest in terms of expectation and difficulty may be that of warning homeland 
security decision makers of imminent threat dispositions. The entire spectrum of 
homeland security decision makers, from citizens to presidents, expects intelligence to 
provide advance notice of adversary activities that may challenge homeland security 
objectives. Warning promotes decision advantage, sound policy decisions and economy 
of forces and resources much needed for already taxed security efforts. The following 
pages assert the benefits of intelligence extend beyond just warning but include the value 
of optimized resources and policy. 
B. OPTIMIZE RESOURCES  
It is precisely when resources are stretched thin and the tasks many, when 
the forces are evenly matched and the issue trembles in the balance that 
good intelligence and sensitive interpretation matter most.  
Walter Laqueur (2002)  
An appreciation for and skillful use of an adaptive threat orientation may position 
homeland security decision makers to take advantage of both offensive and defensive 
security opportunities, “sharpening the gaze” while facilitating a “shortening of the 
sword” within the execution of homeland security objectives, thus optimizing homeland 
security efforts by conserving resources and preserving freedoms (Keegan, 2004, p.387). 
Intelligence, both as a practice and as knowledge, can be instrumental in guiding and 
shaping economical and appropriate security efforts while promoting tailored and specific 
focus to policy and tactical decision makers. 
1. Intelligence Facilitates Identification of Vulnerabilities and 
Opportunities  
This section is organized around the premise that intelligence-based homeland 
security decision advantage, associated with resources and policy optimization efforts, 
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can be most beneficial when used to: 1) mitigate threat significance within security 
vulnerabilities, and 2) optimize efforts to capitalize on security opportunities 
discovered within the threat environment.  The value of intelligence in homeland security 
becomes more demonstrably apparent as decision makers pursue homeland security 
objectives with limited resources in situations of great potential violence or security 
consequence.  
2. Intelligence-Based Decision Advantage and Homeland Security 
Vulnerabilities  
a. Identifying Vulnerabilities  
Vulnerability is a weakness an adversary may seek to exploit (Clark & 
Chenowetth, 2006, p. 95).  As such, vulnerability cannot exist without: 1) a flaw or 
weakness, and 2) an attacker with the capability and/or intent to exploit that flaw or 
weakness.  Vulnerabilities are not “where we think we are weak” but rather security 
situations and operational circumstances that intelligence indicates an adversary may 
successfully exploit.  
Intelligence support to vulnerability mitigation efforts includes providing 
homeland security leaders and practitioners with information that identifies adversary 
strengths, and weaknesses, intentions, limitations, or any other host of factors that may or 
may not make a vulnerability more or less worthy or limited homeland security resources.  
Furthermore, decision makers may derive strategic and tactical benefit from intelligence 
that is able to determine specific terrorist targeting methodologies, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures by which they purport to employ.  Such threat knowledge can be critical 
to security efforts geared toward “hardening” potential vulnerabilities against known or 
anticipated capabilities and also can be invaluable in the creation of strategic plans that 
address the protection of assets of interest (such as critical infrastructure and key 
resources).   
The validity of vulnerability assessments not based on timely, tailored, and 
accurate intelligence should be evaluated with tremendous scrutiny. The proximate 
reality of threat knowledge ought to be the bedrock of every prevention activity because 
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without a minimum domain awareness of the threat, such knowledge provides, every 
actor, and every potentially adversarial element is a threat.  The U.S. has neither the 
resources nor the laws or culture to maintain this security posture or engage in potentially 
uninhibited searches. 
C. DEPICT PROXIMATE REALITY  
The role of most intelligence is not driving decisions in any short term, 
specific way, but contributing to decision-taker’s general enlightenment; 
intelligence producers are in the business of educating their masters.  
Michael Herman (1993, p. 43) 
1. What Is Proximate Reality? 
Proximate reality is an illustrative compilation of observations and analysis 
specific to a certain threat environment at a specific time and place. It is proximate 
inasmuch as it is not, nor can it be, a perfect representation of the “actual” threat, as the 
dynamic and asymmetric homeland security threat data submit to no such description.  
The threat description is “reality” in that it is the sum of all the observed and analyzed 
threat data (signatures, activities, and patterns) analyzed in light of the operational 
objectives and operating environment within that decision maker’s decision space. The 
value of proximate reality is in the capture, articulation, and sharing of an understanding 
of a threat environment previously beyond the common experience of a particular 
decision maker within a specific threatscape.   
For the homeland security intelligence analyst or homeland security leader or 
practitioner, proximate reality may be succinctly defined as a tailored, timely and 
accurate depiction of the totality of threats observed, analyzed, or anticipated by the 
intelligence apparatus within the homeland security threatspace.   
2. Why Proximate Reality? 
We use reference points in our heads to start building beliefs around them 
because less mental effort is needed to compare an idea to a reference 
point than to evaluate it in the absolute. We cannot work without reference 
points.   
Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007, p. 159) 
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A shared proximate reality can add value to homeland decision makers by 
becoming a shared “threat narrative” from which they can interweave their own security 
narratives.  Intelligence scholar and RAND research fellow Gregory Treverton (2009, p. 
75) suggests:  
Ultimately, intelligence is storytelling.  It is helping those who will take 
action construct and adjust the stories in their head that will guide their 
decisions.  Absent some story, new information about a topic is just 
factoid.  The story provides a pigeonhole and context for the new 
information.   
As a captured and articulated interpretation of a threat, proximate reality has the 
potential value of cognitively uniting homeland security leaders and practitioners within a 
common threat envelope on the same threat “page,” at least with regards to the 
capabilities, limitations, and intentions of threats occurring within their shared decision 
space.  Security policy and operations functioning within this shared threat “picture” 
requiring a collaborative response can then programmatically and uniformly plan, equip, 
and respond to those threats, potentially economizing resources or mitigating confusion 
that might have resulted from different decision makers operating from disparate threat 
“realities.”  A shared proximate reality creates an opportunity for those exercising 
judgment within the same sphere of operation to share an understanding of at least the 
threat reasons for the decisions peers within the same sphere are making.  
Lacking an understanding of the proximate reality of a threat environment or 
situation, decision makers may be left in a reactive state and the unnecessarily vulnerable 
position of needing to become “spun up” on the threats during a crisis, or run the chance 
of using dissimilar narratives or experiences as other homeland security decision makers 
operating within the same threat environment.   
3. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage: 
Proximate Reality as a Threat Assessment  
One purpose of threat assessments is to “bring a policy maker who has never 
heard of the subject ‘up to speed’ on the basics of the situation, to project further 
developments in the area, and to guide the policy maker in the choices that are on the 
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agenda” (Codevilla, 2002, p. 206).  In effect, the threat assessment adds value to 
homeland security leaders and practitioners because it potentially creates a baseline threat 
orientation from which changes within that threat environment can be based. 
Comprehension of proximate reality creates a cognitive space within the homeland 
security leader or practitioners’ minds from threat status dialog and baseline 
understanding may evolve and develop even as the very threats of consideration evolve 
and develop. An appreciation for proximate reality of itself suggests the immediate 
understanding (reality) of the threat is perishable and decisions made based on those 
realities may of necessity be adjusted as the intelligence-based threat reality changes.   
The dynamic and asymmetric nature of the homeland security threat suggests any 
“proximate reality” will remain “proximate” only as long as the factors by which that 
reality has been derived remain unchanged.  Each time any factor, be it adversarial, 
environmental, or security driven changes, the “reality” may likewise change.  The 
production and dissemination of “current intelligence” is the process by which 
intelligence professionals keep decision makers informed of changes as they occur and 
are observed within the decision space.   
Both current intelligence reports and threat assessments are mechanisms of 
creating or updating proximate reality (both seeking to define the status of adversary 
capabilities and intent) but due to the limited time and attention of homeland security 
decision makers, the urgency of current intelligence can run the risk of overshadowing 
the importance of foundational understanding of a specific or general threat.  
4. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage: 
Proximate Reality as a Vulnerability Assessment  
If security vulnerabilities are “flaws or weaknesses that can be exploited by an 
attacker,” any coherent discussion of vulnerabilities must be based upon knowledge of 
the attacker (aka capabilities, limitations and intentions) (Jomim, quoted by Rusello, 
1991, p. 109). Unsupported and irrelevant vulnerability assessments can result from 
analysis that does not include timely, accurate, and tailored intelligence.  Knowledge of 
the adversary is paramount for accurate identification, definitions, or descriptions, of 
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tactics techniques or procedures that may be used to exploit security flaws or weaknesses.  
Vulnerabilities cannot exist independently from a threat in the same way risk cannot exist 
independently from vulnerability. 
D. THREAT ORIENTED POLICY AND LEGAL DECISIONS  
Intelligence is a tool needed by policy makers for decisions, a wholly 
pragmatic enterprise in which results are the only criterion of success. 
Walter Laqueur (1985, p. 293) 
Homeland security policy decisions shape how homeland security operations and 
personnel are organized, trained and equipped.  An adaptive threat orientation might then 
be considered a prerequisite to homeland security policy and legal decision advantage.  
The role of intelligence in facilitating the acquisition and maintenance of that adaptive 
orientation and subsequent potential for political and legal decision advantage within that 
threatscapecannot be overstated. This section will detail and discuss the role of 
intelligence in acquiring and maintaining political decision advantage from the 
perspective of federal, state, local, and private industry decision makers.   
1. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage: Political 
Advantage 
Intelligence is an asset or a liability depending on whether intelligence 
helps or hinders the fulfillment of political goals.  
Michael A. Turner (2002, p. 3)  
The U.S. Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, calls for a division of not 
just power within the federal government but between the federal government and the 
several states (Linder, 2010).  The sweeping domain of homeland security encompasses 
each of these layers and branches of government, none of which can legitimately claim to 
optimize their security decisions without the application of threat information to their 
security environment.  This section explores the political and judicial benefits of 
intelligence-based homeland security decision advantage in furtherance of homeland 
security objectives.   
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If politics are the confluence and collision of competing interests, then homeland 
security politics are those with interests rooted in any one of hundreds if not thousands of 
organizational and personal efforts and initiatives to produce desired homeland security 
effects (Sullivan, 2009).  Contemporary domestic security efforts differ from those of just 
a generation ago due in part to the rise in threat from global Jihadi extremists and the 
increased use of terrorism as a domestic form of political influence.  Additionally, as the 
threat of catastrophic terrorist violence has become a reality in the United States, the 
responsibility for preventing, preparing for and responding to this new threat is shared 
across nearly every level of federal, state, local, and tribal government. As such, each of 
these stakeholders comes to the homeland security challenge with distinct charters and 
desired results (DHS, 2007).  Treverton (2009, p. 3) suggests a shift has occurred in 
potential intelligence consumers, away from only federal or national level leaders, 
“National intelligence used to be designed primarily for a relatively small set of political 
and military leaders of states. Now, it could be of use to a huge number or consumers 
from police officers to private sector managers of major infrastructures.”  
Distributed government decision-making authority generates competing political 
interests and potential disparity of access to information (threat and otherwise) among 
these different decision makers.  When governing matters of security, political decision 
makers would be wise to acquire and maintain an adaptive understanding of threats to 
that security.  
The inclusion of intelligence in the political dialog of homeland security 
governance adds a depth of understanding necessary to ensure these political decisions 
are evaluated with the greatest threat understanding possible, lest these security decisions 
(and subsequent allocation of resources or restrictions of freedoms) be used to pursue 
interests beyond the scope of security.  As such, intelligence clearly has place among all 
levels and branches of government charged with operating, overseeing (or funding), or 
enforcing security policy.   
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2. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage: Policy 
Making  
Policy leaders determine the utility of the intelligence they receive based 
on ideological and political factors. 
Michael A. Turner (2002, p. 118) 
Security policy decisions often manifest as choices of public priorities related to 
the use of public resources or limiting certain individual freedoms. In the case of 
homeland security policy, as with similar security policy decisions, “optimal” policy 
decisions may be considered those decisions that provide the greatest amount of security 
opportunity with the fewest restrictions or requirements (costs in freedoms or finances) 
on the constituents or stakeholders whereon security is expected to be provided. 
Treverton (2001, pp. 178, 185) asserts policy makers rely on intelligence in three stages:  
1. If the policymakers are prescient, when the issue is just beginning; 
however there is likely to be little intelligence on the issue at that point. 
2. When the issue is “ripe for decision.” Here policymakers want intelligence 
that permits alternatives to be considered; however, intelligence often is 
only able to provide background information necessary for understanding 
the issue. 
3. When the policymakers have made up their minds on the issue, but only if 
intelligence supports their view.  They may be uninterested or even hostile 
when it does not support their view. 
This first stage is perhaps the most challenging for the homeland security 
intelligence analyst to support his or her policy masters, as usually only the faintest 
signals of threat may be observable, yet, the potential consequences for miscalculating 
the risk could be severe.  The homeland security policy folder is one of many within the 
docket of state, local, federal, and tribal decision makers when it comes to government 
priorities.  Homeland security leaders and intelligence analysts should be constantly 
adjusting their threat orientation based on available threat information and risk analysis. 
If policy makers fail to orient themselves to a threat prior to a crisis they may find 
themselves scrambling to “do anything” regardless of the threat or risk.   
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Former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Morton 
Abramowitz justifies this dark phenomenon as a result of the uncertainty inherent in 
security decisions (and policy) as well as a hyper competitive political environment. 
Since intelligence by its nature deals in uncertainties, Abramowitz confirms the ease of 
which policymakers "pick the intelligence they like" in the pursuit of political objectives.  
(Kessler, 2005, p. A5) 
Another role of intelligence in support of decision advantage and policy 
development relates to the limitations of time and attention policy makers can give to an 
issue.  Intelligence commentator and former Senate Select Intelligence Committee staffer 
Angelo Codevilla notes, “the absorptive capacity of consumers clearly has its limits” and 
those limits are never less forgiving then during crises (2002, p. 53). If policy makers put 
off developing a threat orientation until a crisis erupts, at a time when decision makerss 
should be honing their understanding to a particular threat they may find themselves 
“drinking from a fire hose” of potential threats or outcomes, in addition to attempting to 
craft or execute a mitigation strategy.  Obtaining and maintaining an understanding of the 
proximate threat reality therefore may be a critical factor for the beneficial inclusion of 
intelligence in policy development.  
3. Intelligence-based Homeland Security Decision Advantage: Security 
Functions of American Government  
The first order of business for US national intelligence…is to inform and 
warn the President, the Cabinet, the Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and commanders in the field, domestic law enforcement and homeland 
security authorities in the heartland, and our international allies. 
National Intelligence Strategy (2005, p. 1)  
Since 9/11 the federal government has had to reorient its collection and analysis 
priorities within the United States Intelligence Community inward and rely on state, 
local, private sector, and citizen threat observations instead of relying exclusively on 
overseas threat collection to meet the homeland security intelligence requirements (Allen, 
2006, p. 3).  The attacks of 9/11 awoke the country to the certain fact that the risk of 
terrorist attacks exists within the boundaries of the 54 states and territories, and that 
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citizens, state, local, tribal governments, and private enterprise bear a most vital 
responsibility in observing, analyzing, and disseminating homeland security intelligence 
to the government that might be crucial in preventing, protecting, and eliminating (by 
force or prosecution) terrorist threats to the United States.  
4. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage: 
Federalism and Separations of Powers  
The American domestic intelligence and security information sharing experience 
is unlike that of any other nation because the U.S. Constitution creates separate 
governance powers and authorities between both the branches of the federal government, 
and between the “several” states and central federal government (U.S. Constitution, Art I 
§ 2).  Because both elected and appointed homeland security leaders and practitioners 
span the national gamut of government, an unprecedented challenge has arisen in 
coordinating the appropriate access and usage of intelligence (requirements, analysis, and 
dissemination) to each homeland security stakeholder in an efficient and effective 
manner.  American Federalism was intended to keep government power from being 
consolidated in one branch of the government, and is by design, not the most efficient 
mechanism for governance or information sharing (Metzger, 2003). Federalism does, 
however, ensure that no one body controls an excessive amount of power, be it legal, 
financial, or informational.  Since responsibilities for addressing security issues are 
shared throughout and across the government, access to intelligence pertaining to those 
threats would be wisely shared equally throughout and across the government.  This is a 
critical, if not doctrinal, statutory or Constitutional distinction between homeland security 
and national security:  whereas national security authorities are nested primarily in the 
Constitutional Article 2 powers of the Executive (and to an arguably lesser extent with 
Congress), homeland security is a cross-authority, cross-jurisdictional collaborative 
endeavor.    
“Power,” in the terms of a federalist government, means being able to produce 
legal consequences by taking action concerning some “matter” (Cornell Legal Institute, 
2010).  In many matters of national security and many matters of homeland security, the 
distributions of “legal consequences” (e.g., power) is claimed by the executive branch by 
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way of Constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief, as the “sole organ” for 
international affairs and foreign policy, and his or her duty to “enforce the laws” 
Congress has drawn concerning terrorism.  However, power is also retained by the states 
in the form of police powers for domestic security matters that do not threaten the 
“republican form of government” or the good order and execution of federal programs or 
objectives (Cornell, 2010).  These police powers do not arise from the Constitution per 
se, but are an inherent attribute of the states’ territorial sovereignty.  From this federalist 
setting springs the uniquely national relationship between security decision makers we 
have come to call homeland security.   
a. Security Powers of the State  
The Tenth Amendment directs that “powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people” (U.S. Constitution, Tenth Amendment).  It may then be 
argued the lion’s share of (constitutional) domestic security efforts thus fall upon the 
states, and not the federal government. Accordingly, under the both statute and U.S. 
Constitutional law, individual states have both the right and obligation to seek nationally 
collected and analyzed threat information upon which they can base policies and 
programs designed to maximize the tranquility and protection of their citizens.  
5. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  State 
Police Powers 
Police powers are used to regulate behaviors and enforce order within the states’ 
jurisdiction, and are often framed in terms of public welfare, security and safety 
(Supreme Court Center, 2009).  Included in the police powers of the state are those 
powers under a state’s constitutions that provide for the implementation of martial law or 
other increasingly restrictive government mechanisms used to address homeland security 
incidents. Security actions taken by the state that may infringe upon the liberty of citizens 
ought to be considered as so serious as to demand the inclusion of the very timeliest, 
tailored and accurate intelligence available.  
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Since “all homeland security incidents are local” and elected officials and state 
and local leaders are responsible for the immediate security of their communities, threat 
information pertinent to the security of the states and communities ought to be considered 
in the planning, programming (budget), and training necessary to address those objectives 
(White House, 2003).  Not every state or community may want, need, or be able to afford 
instant or constant intelligence feeds from national or regional intelligence producers.  
Intelligence needs will likely be as diverse as the level and scope of authority and 
responsibility of the homeland security leaders and practitioners involved. Some 
organizations may desire to develop their own observation and orientation programs 
instead of relying on the national system in place. Some state and local organizations 
have even gone as far as to create their own overseas collection and analysis services, 
effectively “working around” the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) for 
source intelligence deemed critical for homeland security decision makers “back home” 
(Viana, 2008).   
Many state constitutions provide mechanisms for Governors to engage in security 
practices that dramatically reduce personal freedoms during time of crisis (Lowenberg, 
2010). The value of intelligence for state and local homeland security leaders may be at 
its greatest when governing the balance of the needs of liberty and security at the lowest 
and most personal levels. 
6. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  Security 
Functions of the Federal Government   
a. The Executive Branch 
Under the Constitution, the President assumes Constitutional and statutory 
national security authority under the “Commander-in-Chief” powers as well as the “laws 
enforced” powers (U.S. Constitution, Art. II §2).  The President also shares emergency 
powers with the Congress, the Judiciary, and the American people (in the states) under 
Article IV § four, which directs the whole of government “provide for the common 
defense”(U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, §4).  Additional support for the role of the executive 
in homeland security can be found in the actual language of the Constitution, which 
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requires the executive “take care” when executing the laws of the nation; this taking 
“care” with regard to executive governance within a threat decision space most certainly 
includes the responsibility of acquiring and maintaining an adaptive threat orientation 
(U.S. Constitution, Art. II §2). 
The security role of the executive has arguably increased in presidential 
priority since September 11, 2001 (Justia.com, 2010). Columbia University Law 
professor and Constitutional scholar Henry P. Monaghan (1970, p. 25)  has proposed that 
contemporary Presidents have embraced the role of “Protector-in-Chief” and with “ever-
increasing frequency…employed that amount of force they deemed necessary to 
accomplish their…(security) policy objectives.” As the executive’s assumption of 
domestic emergency powers has increased, by extension so has the federal demand for 
the production of domestic intelligence and foreign intelligence with the potential to 
impact the homeland security environment. 
7. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  
Executive Homeland Security Policy 
Modern executive level policy specific to homeland security and counterterrorism 
efforts began in 1986 with President Ronald Reagan’s issue of a National Security 
Decision Directive after the hijacking of the Achille Lauro directing the State Department 
to coordinate federal international terrorism policy (White House, 1982).  Twelve years 
later President Bill Clinton (1994) issued the Five Year Interagency Counterterrorism 
and Technology Plan, through the Justice Department, seemingly shifting the focus away 
from the State Department and diplomatic solutions toward a law enforcement focus.  
After 9/11, an avalanche of presidential guidance was generated in an effort to focus the 
national, but especially federal, response to the “global war on terror,” arguably shifting 
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(or at least sharing) federal focus towards the Department of Defense prior to the creation 
of the Department of Homeland Security.1   
While only Executive Order 12333 is central to intelligence, all of these 
documents reference specifically, or by extension, the critical value of intelligence in the 
creation or execution of homeland security operations.  These policies articulate the 
executive’s priorities and attempt to establish a cohesive approach to the exercise of 
government resources and attention with regard to intelligence driven and risk based 
homeland security actions.  In addition to strategies and planning documents, the 
Executive branch publishes higher fidelity guidance with regard to homeland security in 
the form of Homeland Security Presidential Directives.  Unlike strategies, these 
directives are functional as executive orders and carry the full weight of federal law 
(Moss, 2000).   
While Executive sponsored strategies do not carry the weight of law these policies 
act to provide a framework from which other executive branch agencies can draft their 
policies.  These policies likewise inform and invite state and local governments, and 
private actors to plan and operate collectively within a national framework.   
Under the National Emergencies Act, the President may exercise power only after 
declaring a “national emergency” (50 U.S.C 1601-1651, 2009). No statutory definition 
exists however for a “national emergency,” therefore it is a political, not exclusively legal 
decision to declare such an event.  The luster of intelligence can support the President’s 
decision to declare an emergency.  Executive power can also be extended by invoking the 
Stafford Act, which permits the President to provide federal assistance to states 
requesting assistance on the basis of insufficient state resources or expertise in 
performing relief efforts (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
                                                 
1 The National Strategy for Homeland Security is the overarching executive policy for both the 
Department of Homeland Security and national homeland security efforts.  Subordinate or companion 
policies (White House) include: National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), 
National Strategy for Homeland Security (White House, 2002), National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
(2003), National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (2002), National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002), National Money Laundering Strategy (2002), National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace (2002), National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Assets (2003), and National Drug Control Strategy (2002).  
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Act, 1998).  When emergencies where the “subject area” is “exclusively or preeminently 
in the federal purview” the President does not require a request from the State governor 
to invoke the Act and deploy federal, to include Department of Defense, resources to the 
affected area (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 1998).  
Again, this is a political decision that might seek to borrow weight and imply 
justification from the use of intelligence. 
8. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  The 
Executive Cabinet  
Homeland security (and asserted by extension intelligence) statutorily “touches” 
no less than 12 of 15 Cabinet Secretaries (Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland 
Security, Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Labor, Commerce, 
Agriculture, Interior, and the Attorney General).  Additionally each state and territory 
relies on its police powers to protect its citizens and a constitutionally protected right to 
defend against “invasions.” The Constitution continues, “the powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people” (U.S. Constitution Art I, U.S. Constitution, 10th 
Amendment). An examination of the responsibilities and objectives of the two most 
significant “consumers” of State, local, and private sector information is illustrative as to 
why these agencies request access to such information and intelligence. 
9. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  
Department of Homeland Security  
By statute (6 U.S.C. §111(b)(1)(a-h), 2004) the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) mission is to: 
(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 
(B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; 
(C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks 
that do occur within the United States; 
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(D) carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, 
including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises 
and emergency planning; 
(E) ensure that the functions of the agencies and subdivisions within the 
Department that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not 
diminished or neglected except by a specific explicit Act of Congress; 
(F) ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not 
diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the 
homeland; and 
(G) monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, 
coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to 
efforts to interdict illegal drug trafficking.  
DHS is legally prohibited from “investigating and prosecuting acts of terrorism” 
with this authority reserved for “Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies with 
jurisdiction over the acts in question” (Homeland Security Act 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135.  With the exception of the Secret Service, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and the Coast Guard, DHS is completely divorced from investigative and 
law enforcement functions particular to the Department of Justice.  Thus the foremost 
information sharing and intelligence objectives of DHS is prevention of terrorist acts not 
criminal prosecution (Homeland Security Act 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §111). 
DHS (HSA 2002, 102(C)(3)) also has by law, the obligation of “distributing or, as 
appropriate, coordinating the distribution of, warnings and information to State and local 
government personnel, agencies, and authorities and to the public.”  It is with this charge 
that DHS seeks to “fuse” information derived from national intelligence sources with 
locally provided information and intelligence purportedly creating a comprehensive 
threat picture based on all available information.   
a. Department of Homeland Security Information and Analysis 
Division  
The Department of Homeland Security Information and Analysis (DHS 
I&A) division exists to “identify and assess current and future threats to the homeland, 
map those threats against our current vulnerabilities, inform the President, issue timely 
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warnings, and immediately take or effect appropriate preventive and protective action” 
(White House, 2010).  DHS I&A has two primary responsibilities: 1) Threat analysis and 
warning, and 2) Critical infrastructure protection. 
b. DHS Threat Analysis and Warning 
The DHS threat analysis and warning mission is accomplished by 
analyzing threat information gathered by the law enforcement, defense, and “all source” 
information from such varied contributors as public health and weather.  DHS I&A is 
responsible for the national Homeland Security Threat Advisory system and national 
alerts.  Since a purported 85 percen of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key assets 
are within the private sector a critical government mechanism for informing private 
sector leaders responsible for security of those assets and systems is the DHS Homeland 
Security Operations Center (HSOC) (Bellavita, 2009).  The HSOC collects, fuses, 
analyzes and disseminates intelligence reports on industry specific issues and issues 
specific warnings and intelligence to the private sector in those potentially affected areas 
(DHS, 2008). 
c. DHS Critical Infrastructure Protection  
The Office of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (I&A) is 
a statutorily mandated division of the Department of Homeland Security with sweeping 
intelligence and threat analysis responsibilities including the statutory obligation to:   
1. Access, receive, and analyze all source data relating to homeland security 
interests from Federal, State, local agencies (including law enforcement), 
private sector entities, and integrate that information in support of 
Department of Homeland Security missions;  
2. Carry out comprehensive threat assessments on the vulnerabilities of key 
resources and critical infrastructure of the United States;  
3. Integrate the relevant threat information and vulnerability assessments in 
order to identify priorities for protective support measures;  
4. Ensure the timely and efficient access to all information needed by the 
Department of Homeland Security to accomplish its missions;  
5. Develop a comprehensive national plan to secure critical infrastructure 
and key resources;  
 48
6. Recommend measures necessary to protect critical infrastructure and key 
resources in cooperation with the State, local, Federal and the private 
sector;  
7. Disseminate information analyzed by the Office of I&A throughout the 
Department of Homeland Security and all other Federal, State, local, and 
private sector agencies, organizations, or individuals with responsibilities 
relating to homeland security;  
8. And to consult with State and local governments and private sector entities 
to ensure appropriate exchanges of information, including law 
enforcement-related information relating to threats of terrorism against the 
United States;  
9. Ensure all intelligence and information is protected from unlawful 
disclosure and shared, retained and disseminated consistent with published 
national standards; request additional information from other agencies of 
the federal government, State and local government agencies, and the 
private sector relating to threats of terrorism or other areas of 
responsibility assigned to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security (Homeland Security Act 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §121(d)(1-
10)).   
These comprehensive (and statutorily required) responsibilities are 
testament to the colossal expectations the nation has of the intelligence function of the 
Department of Homeland Security.   
The DHS Office of I&A is also required by law to request both 
information from, and disseminate intelligence to non-federal organizations (state, local, 
and private sector entities) without the borrowed subpoena power of the Justice 
Department to compel disclosure.  As such, I&A must rely on non-coercive means to 
acquire the information and intelligence it requires to accomplish its mandated missions.  
DHS I&A must also rely on the domestic threat observation and orientation contributions 
of United States Intelligence Community (USIC) collectors, such as the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Agency, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the State Department’s Office of Information and 
Research for overseas threat indicators or signatures.  For domestic collection DHS I&A 




Border Patrol, Immigration Customs Enforcement, Secret Service, Coast Guard, and the 
Transportation Security Agency) in addition to information collected from state, local, 
private sector, and the general public. 
10. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  Federal 
Bureau of Investigations  
In the United States, domestic intelligence collection is politically and largely 
culturally regarded as a task for law enforcement (Dycus et al., 2002, p. 431).  The 
Attorney General of the United States is expressly vested by Congress with “primary 
investigative authority for all Federal crimes of terrorism” (18 U.S.C. §2333b(f)). Within 
the federal government, by current policy, the National Security Branch (NSB) of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has the broad legal authority to collect domestic 
intelligence within the United States (FBI, 2010).  Although the FBI has no legislative 
charter to conduct intelligence operations per se, it operates under the Attorney General’s 
authority to appoint officials to:  
…detect and prosecute crimes against the United States, assist in the 
protection of the person of the President; and to conduct other 
investigations regarding official matters under the control of the 
Department of Justice and Department of State as may be directed by the 
Attorney General (28 U.S.C. §533).   
On the topic of domestic intelligence operations, a key legal distinction that 
deserves note is the perceived difference between intelligence operations (collection, 
analysis, and dissemination) for prevention purposes and intelligence operations for 
prosecution purposes.  Three levels of federal interest arise in the execution of domestic 
national security intelligence operations: 1) threat assessments, 2) preliminary 
investigations, and 3) full investigations (Office of the Attorney General, 2003, p. 5).  
Understanding the “level” of investigation is important for the government, citizens, and 
stakeholders as the “level” drives different degrees of scrutiny and access to information 
gained during the process.  
Homeland security leaders and practitioners seek intelligence to orient themselves 
to the threat within their jurisdictional or topical environment and decision space.  What 
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homeland security leaders and practitioners need is information to help them make better 
decisions, not necessarily more concrete criminal cases.  Not every decision space in 
homeland security is law enforcement specific, yet an overwhelming amount, perhaps 
even the “default setting” for homeland security intelligence is law enforcement 
information.  Much of the information needed to create the desired threat orientation lies 
beyond the suspicion of crime and within the databases of many private sector enterprises 
(O’Harrow, 2008).  Examples of desired information may include information about 
individuals (travel, commercial transactions, familiar associations, religious affiliation 
etc.,) transportation, finance, health, and critical infrastructure.   
11. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage: Other 
Federal Agencies 
The value of intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency is irrefutable as it has 
the responsibility of the “coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside 
the United States though human sources,” and therefore can only conduct national 
intelligence collection within the United States by non-human intelligence means 
(Intelligence Reform Act §1011, 50 U.S.C.A. §403-4a(d)(3).  It is culturally accepted but 
not statutorily required that the CIA will restrain domestic intelligence collection efforts 
to technical collection (cyber) and open source collection with an international 
intelligence or counterintelligence nexus (Fisher, 2007). 
Other federal agencies that may request homeland security intelligence are the 
Environmental Protection Agency (Lee, 2003), the Department of Defense (2008), the 
Department of Health and Human Services, (2010), the Department of Energy (2010) and 
the Department of the Treasury (2010) or any other federal agency as directed by the 
President (White House, 2005). 
12. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  Congress   
The Constitution grants the Congress power to “make all laws that will be 
necessary and proper” for the function of the federal government (United States 
Constitution Art II, § 8).  Since 1947, Congress has passed over 17 Acts specific to 
intelligence and another 15 acts with domestic security implications.  In addition to its 
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lawmaking powers, Congress has broad financial powers to provide for the “common 
defense” and “general welfare” of the United States, both of great influence in matters of 
homeland security and information sharing and intelligence (U.S. Constitution, Art. 1§ 8, 
(1).   
By proportion of words, the constitution gives an overwhelming amount of 
authority for national security to Congress.  Article I powers (Congressional) trump “two-
to-one” the named national security authorities given in Article II (Executive) that may 
gain benefit from the threat orientation intelligence can facilitate, and include the 
responsibility to:  
• Declare war 
• Some role of Congress in the commitment of troops to combat 
• Raise and support the armed forces 
• Make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces 
• Regulate commerce with foreign nations  
• Provide for the militia and for calling it forth to execute the laws of the 
Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions  
• Make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for executing any power 
conferred by the constitution  
• Provide for the common defense (fund) (United States Constitution Art II, 
§ 8 Id. Sections 1-10) 
13. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  
Lawmaking 
The era of congressionally authorized statutes governing intelligence began with 
the National Security Act of 1947.  Since 1947 Congress has been a vocal critic, quiet 
consumer and significant influence within the intelligence community.  After 9/11 
congressional response by way of new and revised statutes was both swift and 
voluminous.  The most significant post-9/11 statutes include: 
• The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act of 2004 
• The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
• The USA Patriot Act of 2001  
• USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 
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• The Military Commissions Act 2006 
• The Aviation and Transportation Act of 2001 
• The Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 
• The Maritime Transportation Act of 2001 
• The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act of 2002 
• The Terrorism Risk Insurance Coverage Act of 2002 
• The Terrorist Bombings Convention Implementation Act of 2002 
14. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  
Additional Congressional Homeland Security Objectives 
In addition to lawmaking and appropriations, the Congress is instrumental in 
maintaining balance of power within the federal government by use of its oversight 
authority.  Congress exercises this authority by reviewing, monitoring, and supervising 
federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation by way of standing 
committees and ad hoc hearings.   
The relationship between the intelligence community as an appendage of the 
executive branch and Congress as a consumer or overseer has perhaps a much a 
tumultuous history as can be had between a functions of government under executive 
power (intelligence) and another branch of government (Snider, 1997). Politically, 
Congress has a penchant for “throwing” intelligence “under the bus” for failures of 
government involving security interests or for overstepping the legal or policy bounds the 
intelligence agency was directed to abide (Pelosi vs CIA, 2009).  The intelligence 
community likewise has from time to time expressed exasperation at being caught 
between the security policy machinations of the executive and his Cabinet and the desires 
and intents of Congress (Shelby, 2002).  A common, yet key, meme for intelligence 
professionals with regard to “the Hill” is that Congressional committees with intelligence 
stewardships are often less interested in overseeing and supporting improved intelligence 
than fixing blame and finding fault for political reasons (Tenet, 1995).   
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15. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  The 
Judiciary  
A general must be governed by his intelligence and must regulate his 
measures by his information. It is his duty to obtain correct information. 
Chief Justice John Marshall, (Supreme Court decision Tatum v. Laird, 
1971) 
The judicial branch is charged with interpreting the laws Congress enacts and 
ruling on the constitutionality of executive actions (Onecle, 2005).  Admittedly, 
intelligence is not evidently critical for the good order and function of the judiciary, 
however in the application of the law an understanding of incident circumstances and 
threats at the time of an act may be beneficial in determining the “reasonableness” of 
actions taken within the homeland security threat environment in determining matters of 
law. 
16. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage: At 
Common Law 
In addition to Constitutional law and statutes and regulations, the courts rely on 
common law rulings to guide judicial interpretation of homeland security law.  Common 
law is derived from judicial decisions and opinions that are constantly evolving as new 
cases and rulings emerge (Blacks, 1999).  Common law has legal implications for 
intelligence and information sharing because of the civil lawsuits that could potentially 
emerge as a result of negligence and complicated contracts.   The effect of intelligence on 
common law is perhaps most likely to affect the following fundamentally accepted legal 
principles:  
a. Negligence 
Intelligence can have a decisive role in determining homeland security 
negligence rulings because the legal standards for negligence claim take account of a 
“failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have 
exercised in a similar situation,” (Blacks, 1999, p. 1056) or as “conduct that falls below 
the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of 
harm” (Law.com, 2010).  Without even a perfunctory understanding of the potential 
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threat, defining the elements of a standard of reasonableness or appropriate “standards of 
care” may prove excessively cumbersome for judges and juries to uniformly establish.  
Prior to 9/11 the duty of care and reasonableness factors did not reach or include 
elements common to terrorism.  As of yet, even in the wake of 9/11, the courts have yet 
to formalize, a new “reasonable person” standard for terrorism cases but numerous legal 
scholars suggest the sensational nature and prevailing fear that “terrorism can strike 
anywhere” will in fact force a reconsideration of reasonableness elements of counter 
terrorism and security standards (Findlaw.com, 2010). 
b. Contracts 
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties creating 
obligations that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law (Blacks, 1999, 2131).  
With regard to homeland security cases, common law actions for breach will likely 
involve one party defaulting or seeking to terminate as a result of a potential or actual 
homeland security incident (Anikeef, Bethune, Gage, Housman, Kalberman, Krachman et 
al., 2003, p. 78).  Whether direct or tenuous, parties may seek to apply either a force 
majeure (Mitras, 2008, p. 350) or frustration (Black’s, 1999, p. 679) legal defense to 
contracts lawsuits.  An appropriate understanding of the situation via an accurate threat 
orientation could be vital in determining issues of fact and reasonableness in contracts 
cases.  
17. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  The 
Statutory Role of Intelligence 
Federal, State, and local governments and intelligence, law enforcement, 
and other emergency preparation and response agencies must act in 
partnership to maximize the benefits of information gathering and 
analysis [emphasis added]to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks.  
6 U.S.C § 48 (b) 10 
A very good reason to acquire and apply threat knowledge in a homeland security 
decision-making process is in many cases, it is statutorily required—that is, it is the law.  
Intelligence law dictates how intelligence collection, analysis, and application efforts 
must be conducted, in addition to influencing other significant legal doctrines (like torts 
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and contracts) within the homeland security realm. Most homeland security laws are 
federal in nature, and thus apply primarily to the federal government, however recent 
case law exists that suggests failure to comply with any reasonable procedures that could 
have avoided “disruptions” or injuries may be considered as “strong evidence of 
actionable negligence as a matter of law” (Connecticut State Supreme Court, 2006).   
E. OVERCOME DETRIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND DECISION 
BIASES 
The human mind is poorly designed to deal with uncertainty and so tends 
to seek information that confirms an already-held judgment and rejects 
information that is contrary to the prevailing view. 
Richard J. Heur (1999) 
1. The Priority Value of Intelligence in Making Decisions  
Decision scientists and information management theorists assert that information 
has non-linear instead of linear value (Foster, 2005). Knowledge of an adversary’s 
capabilities, limitations, and intentions literally define the environment as one requiring 
security efforts in the first place.  Without any foreknowledge of the “boogieman” there 
is neither reason to fear nor take security precautions to protect against that threat.  
For example, if in attempting to thwart imminent terrorist attacks, information 
regarding the capabilities and limitations of a terrorist group may have greater tactical 
value than the ideology or history of that group.  Similarly, information regarding 
specific terrorist group leadership profiles may have less value to an elected official 
voting on homeland security budget issues than information regarding the strategic 
terrorist partnerships or state ties a terrorist organization may maintain.  
Two factors that may drive a heightened psychological value of intelligence for 
homeland security decision makers are the analytical characterizations of information 
based on 1) timing, and 2) relevance (Klein, 2003).  This is important for homeland 
security decision makers seeking threat understanding because “racking and stacking” 
information under extreme psychological stress without being oriented to the potential 
security impact certain different types of information can have on decisions could result 
in ill-advised decisions with potentially (yet avoidable) catastrophic  consequences.   
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2. Intelligence-Based Homeland Security Decision Advantage:  
Overcoming Decision Biases 
Biases are preferences or tendencies that can undermine rigorous 
analytical inquiry by influencing or predetermining our approach and its 
outcomes. 
Gary Klein (IAD, 2009, slide 53) 
The importance decision makers place on previous cognitive understanding as a 
mechanism for considering new decisions is critical according to decision science 
research professor David Snowden (2007, p. 220):  
What we actually do is search our memories to find the pattern from our 
previous experiences that appears to fit.  If we cannot find a pattern from 
our previous experiences then we extrapolate possible future patterns until 
the first ‘fit’ one appears to apply and use that. 
As homeland security proximate realities ought to change in direct relation to the 
rate of threat change (and the ability of intelligence to observe and orient in relation to 
that change) and environmental change, each “former” reality then may become a 
“previous experience” per Snowden’s decision-making model.  
Homeland security leaders and practitioners who disregard the potential negative 
impact of decision biases may run the risk of marginalizing the importance of new 
information or ideas and thus undermine their own decision advantage.  The inclusion of 
intelligence into the decision process can assist decision makers to identify and overcome 
such biases, as doing so can facilitate the creation of new cognition and narratives, or 
provide evidence that biases and heuristics currently embraced are unsupported by fact or 
theory.  The following is a synopsis of psychological biases, the negative effects of which 
may be avoided or mitigated if threat intelligence is included as a decision factor. 
Additionally, although not a bias per se, certain heuristics can be confronted and 
challenged by using an adaptive threat orientation (Croskerry, 2002).  
a. Vulnerability Heuristic 
A heuristic is a mental shortcut or pre-selection decision makers may rely 
upon to order situations into familiar mental processes (Everson & Hammer, 2010).  A 
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popular, yet potentially limiting heuristic within the homeland security community is the 
vulnerability heuristic; which suggests when threat knowledge (capability, limitation, 
intent) is absent, uncertain, or unknown then risk models should be based strictly on 
widely accepted but un-validated security  vulnerabilities within the system in question 
(Delor & Hubert, 2000).  This heuristic is limiting because it effectively reduces the 
impact value of the threat quotient within the risk formula, potentially dramatically 
skewing the results, generally in favor of increased resources to “shore up” the 
vulnerability while adding little if any true risk protection.   
The Government Accounting Office (GAO, 2000, p. 6) reports on the 
potential drawbacks of the vulnerability heuristic:    
Without the benefits that a threat and risk assessment provides, many 
agencies have been relying on worst case scenarios to generate 
countermeasures or establish their programs.  Worst case scenarios are 
extreme situations and, as such, may be out of balance with the threat.  By 
using worst case scenarios, the federal government is focusing on 
vulnerabilities (which are unlimited) rather than credible threats (which 
are limited).  By targeting investments based on worst case scenarios, the 
government may be over funding some initiatives and programs and 
underfunding the more likely threats the country will face. 
An adaptive threat orientation focuses the threat into the context of the 
decision maker’s goals with regard to securing both the vulnerability and the greater 
security within the decision space.  In an environment of limited resources, vulnerability 
heuristics can handicap decision maker’s efforts to prioritize time or available resources 
in furtherance of their security objectives.   
b. Choice Biases  
A bias is a term used to describe a tendency or preference towards a 
particular perspective, ideology or result, when the tendency interferes with the ability to 
be impartial, unprejudiced, or objective (Dictionary.com, 2010).  Cognitive biases, or 
biases related to a person’s tendency to make errors of judgment based on processing of 
information, may be particularly troublesome for homeland security practitioners and 
leaders who, perhaps without foundational understanding of threat situation, thrown into 
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situations of extreme volatility without knowing either the proximate reality of the threat 
situation or the capabilities and limitations of intelligence to know and communicate such 
understanding (Allpsyche, 2010).  The remainder of this chapter focuses on identifying 
and acknowledging the existence and impact these biases can have on homeland security 
decisions and how intelligence might be a useful enabler in overcoming these biases.  
1.)  Habit.  Familiar options are often the first sought by decision 
makerss because they are usually deemed reliable (Lowenstein, Donoghue & Rabin, 
2003).  The asymmetric nature of homeland security threats and the unique response 
usually required to prevent, protect, or respond to threats to domestic security very likely 
will require unfamiliar, or at least less commonly relied upon responses.  Threat 
information can cue decision makerss to consider options other than the most familiar.  
2.)  Attenuation:  Oftentimes decision makers will attempt to 
simplify or categorize a situation into a preexisting solution set (Jenkin, 2006).  Timely 
and accurate application of threat information can help to avoid the undue simplification 
of complex situations and the unintended consequences of “low-balling” the potential 
outcome of a situation.  
c. Confidence Bias  
1.)  Completeness Bias.  Once a certain degree of confidence is 
attained, the temptation can arise to not only cease to consider alternative outcomes or 
solutions, but deliberately seek to quell such dialog. (Sulistyawati & Chui, 2009).  
Intelligence can be a valuable asset when attempting to keep decision makers oriented to 
the threat situation as the observations and analysis indicate and not by faulty 
assumptions or outdated confidences interpret them to be.  
Additionally, improper use of intelligence or disregard for an 
adaptive threat orientation can fuel completeness bias in that decision makers may cling 
to decisions previously made based on intelligence presented at the time that may have 
since changed. Reliance on “the answer” in lieu of “an answer” based on the best 
available threat intelligence may be indicative of completeness bias and may result in 
suboptimal or unnecessarily rigid security decisions or courses of action.   
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2.)  Confirmation Bias.  As opinions, courses of action, or concepts 
of reality are created, the occasion may arise that may promote a selective focus on only 
new information that confirms the decision makers’ view, often ignoring or rejecting 
contrary data (Nickerson, 1998).  Intelligence is generally (or at least theoretically should 
be) distinguishable as from other information relied upon by to decision makers as being 
derived from the observation and analysis of events outside of the direct influence of that 
decision maker,  and thus (theoretically) insulated from confirmation biases.  Intelligence 
professionals have an obligation to convey both the threat knowledge available and the 
potential consequences that could accompany rejecting or ignoring such knowledge.  
3.)  Memory Biases.  Selective recall is an example of a memory 
bias by which the disproportionate use of information we remember and/or use, primarily 
because of how recent or prominent in the memory due to emotional content the 
information is (Roy, Christenfeld, McKenzie, 2005).  Threat knowledge can be especially 
valuable in overcoming memory biases because of the extreme emotional response to 
homeland security threats and events.   
4.)  Naïve Statistics Biases: Frequencies and Probabilities.  
According to research, decision makers have a tendency of erroneously correlating 
frequencies and probabilities (Reyna, Brainerd, 2008).  Intelligence can assist homeland 
security decision makers understand the spectrum of possible events or courses of action 
holistically, without relying strictly on single source statistics or probabilities.  
5.)  Adjustment Biases: Anchoring and Conservatism.  The 
assessment of departures from an expected norm (“unusualness”) is generally unduly 
influenced by the assessor’s baseline expectation (Bunn, 1975).  The reluctance to change 
mental models in the face of unexpected or undesired information is consistent with 
conservatism.  Threat knowledge can help to expose decision makers both to the threat 
behavior departures observed and the potential consequences of inaction in favor of 
conservative bias.   
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6.)  Presentation Biases: During a crisis, eye-watering amounts of 
information can be presented to decision makers, often framed in the perspective of the 
individual or agency presenting the information.  A uniform, or at least cursory 
understanding of the threat the organization or coalition of organizations face (as is 
usually the case in homeland security events) can be helpful in creating a common threat 
“frame” from which potential courses of action can be created, and from which 
departures from that frame can be scrutinized and accepted or rejected.  
7.)  FalseA.  The cognitive adaptive theory of problem solving 
suggests we address problems by drawing upon solutions to problems we have faced in 
the past and applying those solutions (with adaptations as necessary) to current 
challenges (Gentner & Landers, 1985).  Tailored, timely, and accurate threat information 
applied, (understanding) can be used by decision makerss and their staffs to challenge 
analogies and avoid the drawing of analogies that are inconsistent with the existing threat 
situation.  
8.)  Attribution Biases.  Information can be over-credited or 
discredited based on its attribution (source) (Tetlock & Levi, 1982).  Furthermore, 
attribution in a social psychology decision-making model suggests an attribution risk 
exists when decision makerss attribute the cause of events or behaviors to personal or 
group characteristics rather than circumstances (Id).  The importance of attribution is no 
small factor in investigating or responding to homeland security events, thus timely and 
accurate threat information regarding the event can be critical in overcoming potential 
decision-based attribution errors.         
3. Summary 
Intelligence can be valuable in overcoming psychological barriers to effective 
decision making because: 
• The relevance and impact of intelligence in contrast to other types of 
information in a security environment may lubricate choice with regard to 
potential courses of action based on known or anticipated consequences  
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• Intelligence can temper fear of the unknown or the unknowable by 
distinguishing that which is known and can be knowable from that which 
is not or cannot be known or knowable 
• Intelligence can be valuable in overcoming heuristics and biases 
detrimental to effective decision making because it can facilitate the 
creation of new and more accurate cognition or narratives, or provide 
evidence that biases and heuristics currently embraced are unsupported by 
fact or theory 
F. INTELLIGENCE-BASED HOMELAND SECURITY DECISION 
ADVANTAGE: INTELLIGENCE AS A COMMODITY AND SYMBOL  
Intelligence can be valuable to homeland security leaders and practitioners as a 
status symbol or as a commodity in and of itself. Not an “operational” value per-se, the 
commodity and symbolic value of intelligence can be used as leverage to further both 
organizational and personal objectives. The decision advantage that intelligence can 
provide can add to the reputation of a decision maker.  One known to have access to 
intelligence can be seen by others without that threat understanding or access as having 
either access or information advantages.  
a. Intelligence as a Commodity 
Economists establish the value of a product or service may be calculated 
by determining either 1) its exchange value or 2) its operational value (Demming, 1999).  
The exchange value of intelligence may be driven by how much an organization or party 
is willing to compensate (in barter or cash) for access to or possession of that intelligence.  
During the Cold War the intelligence collection focus of the U.S. government was 
foreign, not domestic.  The idea of having to pay for or barter for intelligence, data, or 
information is relatively new within the federal U.S. intelligence community at large, as 
until 9/11 they had a monopsony (a buyer’s monopoly) on all nationally relevant 
intelligence.  All of the intelligence needed for pre-9/11 federal security actions were 
deemed to be the purview of the federal government (with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations handling domestic security intelligence).  In a post-9/11 era, with much of 
the intelligence collection and consumption needed for homeland security decisions being 
centered in the sub-national and private sector level, a new paradigm for domestic 
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collection and consumption must be adopted giving “owners” of intelligence data or 
information of interest to the government an exchange value from which they can 
operate.  Homeland security leaders and practitioners that possess this desired 
information may be in a position to leverage this exchange value within the homeland 
security intelligence community or with other homeland security decision makers for 
political, organizational, or information advantage.   
b. Intelligence as a Credential  
Another tangible benefit of participation within the intelligence 
community is the much coveted “blue badge” or security clearance that entreats one 
access behind the secrecy “curtains” drawn to keep intelligence sources and methods 
secure.  While the whole matter of security clearances for homeland security leaders and 
practitioners is a hotly debated issue within the homeland security community, the fact 
remains leaders and practitioners with security clearances are granted greater access, and 
are subsequently more privileged to information and classified peer networks than those 
that do not have a security clearance.  There is also the perception of a heightened status 
or professional reputation among the popular media also often chooses to identify 
domestic public safety personnel as either having a security clearance or not, again 
signifying the heightened status of one having access to information others do not (Reese, 
2005).   
2. Conclusion: Why Is Homeland Security Intelligence So Hard? 
I don’t know what kind of intelligence I need but I know it when I get it.  
Henry Kissinger (1981, p. 252) 
Due to the distributed accountability for domestic security decisions spread 
throughout the country and across the political spectrum, leaders and practitioners that 
were not previously able to or required to rely on national level intelligence agencies for 
knowledge are now having high level intelligence thrust upon them, very often with little 
or no orientation or understanding of what that intelligence has to do with their decisions.  
With such a wide, deep and diverse pool of potential decision makers, those responsible 
for homeland security intelligence production and orientation are woefully under-
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resourced and under-networked to do the orienting for which they should be charged.  
The threat information required by a city council to make security decisions related to a 
municipal budget is much different than the threat information required by the Joint-
Terrorism-Task Force to interdict or disrupt terrorist activities.  But in many cases 
homeland security decision makers are relying on the same processes and products to 
provide observation and orientation for both decision-making bodies.  Homeland security 
intelligence is difficult in part because of the enormous quantity of homeland security 
leaders across the nation demanding timely, tailored, and accurate threat information. 
Perhaps one of the most formidable challenges to heightened threat understanding 
within the homeland security community are unreal expectations of what threat 
information can uniformly provide and what it cannot.  In an age of dramatic Hollywood 
and television espionage thrillers, homeland security consumers run the risk of becoming 
unrealistically reliant upon “just in time” predictive assessments where intelligence 
analysts are able to pinpoint the location of terrorist suspects or threatening devices based 
on mythical satellite capabilities or one-in-a-million analytical connections.   
Intelligence represents a programmed and repeatable transition of data from 
secrecy and ignorance to openness and utility, the ultimate benefit of which should be the 
decision maker’s increased understanding of a threat.  At the apex of its value 
intelligence can be a comprehensive, reliable, swift, and relevant mechanism by which 
decision makers can observe and orient their own decisions in light of the challenges 
brought on by various threats to organizational objectives.   
G. SUMMARY 
• The aggregate value of intelligence to homeland security decision makers 
can be deduced as decision advantage within decision spaces occupied by 
a threat. If there is an ideal “end state” for HSINT, it may be as a 
facilitating factor of decision advantage, an advantage that requires 
constant observation and orientation to the ever-changing threat 
capabilities, limitations, and intentions within the homeland security 
environment.  
• Homeland security leaders and practitioners should fund, organize, equip, 
train, and rely on  intelligence for two primary operational purposes—to 
mitigate the negative effects of surprise and to optimize security efforts. 
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These are the “fruits” of the intelligence labor by which all operational 
intelligence support should be evaluated.  Both of these “fruits” however 
stem from the tree of threat understanding, defined in this chapter as the 
depiction of proximate threat reality.  
• If not for the uncertainty inherent to the homeland security environment, 
the costs in resources and potential limitation of liberties required by 
intelligence may be difficult to justify.  This chapter seeks to define and 
examine the specific values of intelligence as a “tempering” agent.   
At best, the intelligence support homeland security leaders and practitioners, 
elected officials, leaders of industry and service organizations, the media and especially 
the American people can expect to reliably and consistently receive is in direct proportion 
to the amount of collective priority intelligence receives in the development of policy and 
execution of security operations.  It is unreasonable to expect to be immediately oriented 
to a complex threat environment that has vexed the security community of the world for 
the past 100 years merely because it effects them now.  Leaders and practitioners willing 
to pay the price in treasure and attention to attain and maintain an adaptive threat 
orientation will be more adequately postured to operate in this threat environment than 
those that do not. Decision advantage against a globally connected, highly adaptive and 
ruthless enemy, whose identities, targets, and modus operandi can change literally at the 
speed of thought is a most audacious goal for homeland security decision makers and one 
we should pursue, knowing full well we may fail more times than we succeed, but that 
even in the attempt to secure decision advantage we will reach a level of threat 
understanding across the homeland security enterprise previously unattainable.  
Of all the fruits of intelligence for the picking, I submit the greatest is threat 
orientation. Good intelligence may be written, posted or spoken, but as I have outlined 
here, any intelligence can be of great importance or no importance depending on the use 
to which the recipient puts it.  Homeland security leaders and practitioners cannot create 
an adaptive threat orientation with a binge and purge diet of intelligence factoids or just-
in-time briefing marathons.  Yale philosopher William Graham Sumner (1906, p.632) 
taught: 
The critical habit of thought, if usual in society, will pervade all its mores, 
because it is a way of taking up the problems of life. Men educated in it 
cannot be stampeded by stump orators...They are slow to believe. They 
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can hold things as possible or probable in all degrees, without certainty 
and without pain. They can wait for evidence and weigh evidence, 
uninfluenced by the emphasis or confidence with which assertions are 
made on one side or the other. They can resist appeals to their dearest 
prejudices and all kinds of cajolery. 
It is my hope and anticipation that as homeland security leaders, practitioners, 
politicians, and public awaken to the opportunities for benefit to be gained by prioritizing 
an adaptive threat orientation that revolutionary improvements to community-wide 
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